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 ABSTRACT 
 
Hurricane Katrina spurred the largest mass migration in United States’ history since 
the Dust Bowl.  However, many residents of the Gulf Coast decided not to evacuate.  
This thesis examines the issue of non-evacuation during Katrina.  First, it situates the 
topic theoretically, in relation to four distinct literatures: demographic studies of 
migration; environmental sociology; the sociology of disaster; and the political 
geography of place.  Among other things, this discussion suggests that social networks 
may have played an important cultural and material role in households’ evacuation 
decisions.  This expectation is tested in the second phase of this study using data from 
Harvard Medical School’s Hurricane Katrina Community Advisory Group’s survey of 
Gulf Coast residents. Contrary to expectations, however, the analyses here provide no 
evidence that networks affected the odds of timely evacuation during Hurricane 
Katrina.  Instead, educational attainment was a significant predictor of evacuation 
behavior in the New Orleans metropolitan area; race and income were significant 
factors in the non-New Orleans sample.  Moreover, storm preparation behavior and 
the number of evacuation warnings received by households both had significant 
effects on the odds of evacuating before the storm in the New Orleans metropolitan 
sample.  Despite a number of key limitations imposed by the secondary nature of the 
data utilized in this thesis, the theoretical and empirical insights of this research 
suggest that future research should continue to seek a more nuanced understanding of 
evacuation behavior during extreme weather events. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
On Monday, August 29, 2005, at 6:10 a.m. CDT, Hurricane Katrina made 
landfall at Buras, Louisiana.  Fueled by unusually warm waters, the storm had reached 
Category five status as it crossed the Gulf of Mexico, packing sustained winds of over 
155 m.p.h.  Although Katrina had been downgraded to Category Three strength by the 
time of landfall, it still unleashed sustained winds of up to121 m.p.h., pounding rains, 
and violent storm surge across a large swath of the Gulf Coast  (109th U.S. Congress).  
By the time the destruction ceased (long after the actual storm passed), Katrina proved 
to be one of the most devastating ($300 billion, 2.5 million residences damaged) and 
deadly (at least 1,800 people killed) storms the United States had ever seen.   
Amidst all of the chaos and tragedy, images of residents stranded on their 
rooftops, crowded in and around the Superdome, and floating dead in the floodwaters 
were particularly disturbing to citizens in the U.S. and across the world.  They raised a 
series of long-neglected questions about the class and “color of disaster” in the United 
States (Dyson 2006).  Among many such observations by scholars and journalists, 
examples include the bias in evacuation plans favoring those who owned cars, the 
maltreatment of poor, and primarily black, evacuees in government-run shelters, and the 
disproportionate degree of physical damage in high-minority and low-income parishes 
and neighborhoods (Brookings Institution 2005, Brodie et al. 2006, Myers et al. 2008).  
Consistent with the thoughts of even the earliest sociologists of disaster (e.g. Quarantelli 
1978), these scholars have demonstrated that the acute stress of Hurricane Katrina 
exposed many already-existing social problems.   
The magnitude of disruption caused by the storm was embodied in the 700,000 
to 1.2 million people who fled the affected areas—the largest mass migration in the 
U.S. since the Dust Bowl of the 1930s (Picou and Marshall 2007).  Where these 
evacuee-migrants went, what they did in their destination, and whether or not they 
2 
returned (or plan to do so) all have important implications for their individual social and 
economic prospects, as well as the demographic and economic future of the Gulf Coast 
and receiving communities across the country (Fussell et al. 2010, Hori and Shafer 
2010). 
That said, this thesis is based on the premise that there is also much to learn by 
shifting our gaze to those who did not flee in advance of the storm.  Giving particular 
attention to the New Orleans metropolitan area, it addresses the general question of why 
people stayed in their homes until after the storm struck, or never left at all.  Comparing 
evacuee and non-evacuee households, this research explores the household-level factors 
that affected the odds of timely evacuation.  The relative extent of households’ social 
networks are of particular interest, as the main expectation of this study is that 
households with few distant social ties were more likely to have stayed through the start 
of the storm than households with high levels of network connections outside of their 
home county/parish.  Those socially isolated households with low levels of both local 
and distant social ties are expected to have been the most likely to stay through at least 
part of the storm.  These expected relationships will be considered in the context of 
historically important race and class relations, as well as other factors that previous 
research suggests may influence evacuation behavior. 
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 This thesis contributes to the broad and burgeoning literature examining the 
relationship between social dynamics and the environment in general, and the sociology 
of Hurricane Katrina in particular.  More specifically, it addresses the issue of non-
evacuation by engaging four literatures within social science: (1) demographic studies 
of migration, (2) environmental sociology, (3) the sociology of disaster; and (4) the 
political geography of place.  This integrated approach seeks to overcome anecdotal and 
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commonsensical accounts of the storm by developing a perspective that is attuned to 
social structures and the more nuanced dimensions of social relations.   
This attempt to locate the root of individual behavior in the context of micro-
level social relations and macro-level structures is consistent with one of the 
fundamental tasks of sociology.  This, as C.W. Mills puts it, is to develop “the capacity 
to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate 
features of the human self—and see the relations between the two” (Mills 7).  In this 
case, the evacuation behavior of households will be analyzed at the population level, in 
an attempt to identify the social conditions that affected the odds that households would 
behave in a particular way.    
 To better situate this thesis and frame its precise research questions, it is worth 
addressing a number of theoretical and substantive lines of research that this study 
draws upon and is in dialogue with.  These include the sociology of migration and 
environmental change, the discourse of displacement, and the broader policy 
implications of disaster theory and research.  The following sections will locate this 
research in relation to these key issues—a discussion that will serve as a point of 
departure for a more detailed review of the literature relevant to this study. 
 
The Sociology of Migration and Environmental Change 
The methodology and substantive findings of this thesis contribute to research 
on the relationship between human migration and environment change, both acute (e.g. 
flooding) and long-term (e.g. desertification).  In particular, this study challenges 
approaches that seek to isolate the causal power of environmental variables in the 
migration decision-making process (e.g. Reuveny and Moore 2009).  Such works 
exemplify what Suhrke (1994) classifies as a “maximalist point of view,” from which 
“the environment is the primary, if not only cause of migration” (in Carr 926).  Such 
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perspectives fail to account for the sociological factors that complicate the environment-
migration relationship, even under conditions of extreme environmental stress.  A more 
satisfactory approach would seek to understand environmental push factors, as well as 
the structural and cultural social conditions that affect a society’s ability and proclivity 
to mitigate, adapt to, or flee from these changes.  Such factors must be incorporated into 
multivariate, interdisciplinary frameworks for analysis of migration. 
 A review by Hunter (2005) demonstrates that such integrative approaches are 
both necessary and possible. Among other insights, she cites previous research to 
suggest that we must consider that (a) even in the face of dramatic environmental 
hazards/disasters, mobility may not be possible or practical for some groups; and (b) 
environmental hazards are perceived through culturally specific lenses, making the 
degree to which they prompt migration highly variable.  Hunter concludes, “the 
association between migration and environmental hazards varies by context, hazard 
type, and household characteristics” (Hunter 297).  Offering a slightly different take on 
this issue, Carr (2005) makes an equally important point as he writes,  
 
…we must make explicit the connection between the political ecological 
attention to the social construction of the environment and the 
contemporary migration literature's minimalist focus on migrant 
subjectivities as a driver of migration. In short, we need to theorize 
explicitly how people apprehend, negotiate, and transform their local 
context in a manner that links environment to migration (Carr 929). 
 
It is important to note that these arguments concerning migration are consistent 
with developments in the broader field of environmental sociology, which has taken up 
the theoretical problematic of understanding the relation between “society” and 
“nature”.  As Murphy (1994) puts it, “the relationship between social action and the 
dynamic processes of nature will have to be incorporated into sociological theory” 
(Murphy ix).  Goldman and Schurman (2000) make a similar suggestion, writing, 
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“studies of nature-society relations need to consider ecological processes, political-
economic structures, and meanings, values and agency as necessary and complementary 
components of analysis” (Goldman and Schurman 565).  Although it may be difficult to 
fully deconstruct the nature-society binary on a practical basis, it is nonetheless 
necessary to better incorporate the fluid and mutually constitutive aspects of this 
relation into social and environmental research. 
Indeed, such works lend support to the argument that the environment is 
inextricably linked to many social processes, including migration.  This research 
highlights the complex and contingent nature of these connections, noting the 
significant mediating role that both cultural and structural factors play between 
environmental processes and social action.  This thesis draws upon these insights to 
consider the link between migration and Hurricane Katrina.  Sociological research on 
such extreme events is particularly important, as scholars and policymakers still often 
fail to view disasters through an adequately nuanced lens that engages micro- and 
macro-level aspects of social organization. 
 
The Discourse of Displacement 
Shifting attention to the residents of the Gulf coast who did not flee in advance 
of the storm is, in part, a strategy of challenging those scholars who use the terms 
“displacement” and “forced migration” uncritically.  Although the language of 
displacement rightly emphasizes that some instances of human mobility are less 
voluntary than others, the voluntary-involuntary binary that such works depart from 
ultimately obfuscates the complexities that underlie any decision to migrate. 
Of course, this is by no means the first acknowledgement of this problem.  
Researchers across various disciplines have argued that disaster- and environment- 
related migrations are less straightforward than often portrayed.  In an important 
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challenge to the increasingly popular term “environmental refugee”, Black (2001) 
writes 
 
It is unclear that the complex set of factors that lead to ‘environmental 
migration’… would suddenly evaporate or crystallize into a single 
‘environmental’ cause at the time people become refugees. Although a 
distinction could be sustained at the level of proximate causes of flight, 
this is unhelpful from an academic point of view if it is accepted that the 
response to forced migration needs to be guided by underlying, rather 
than simply proximate causes (Black 13). 
 
Similarly, other scholars have demonstrated the agency of actors to adapt to and resist 
the stresses of environmentally hazardous environments.  Lein (2000) makes a 
particularly notable contribution by examining data on slum-inhabitants in Bangladesh, 
a country that is commonly (and quite rightly) used to justify dire warnings about 
environment-induced migrations.  Contrary to the conventional portrayal of this 
country, however, this scholar argues that the empirical evidence paints a much more 
complex picture.  He writes 
 
…mass poverty and the special environmental setting in Bangladesh 
make it tempting to emphasize the involuntary aspects of migration… 
For an outsider, it is extremely difficult to apprehend that in one sense 
people willingly settle in the middle of a violent river, or one of the 
devastating urban slums of Dhaka.   However, to see internal as well as 
international migration in Bangladesh as mechanistic responses to 
environmental or economic circumstances is to underestimate the 
complexities of migration behavior… (Lein 2000: 126).   
 
The anthropologist James Ferguson (1992) makes a similar call to consider the 
contingencies of how exogenous “push” factors are actually experienced.  He writes, “at 
a time when anthropologists are becoming more concerned with such things as 
displacement, migration, and exile, it is perhaps useful to remind ourselves that such 
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conditions are rarely experienced as absolute, unambivalent, or final” (Ferguson 90).  
Such processes are instead embedded within and mediated by a social reality of 
complex structures and cultural forces. 
The abovementioned arguments serve as important warnings against hastily 
ascribing causes to migration behavior in environmentally tenuous or hazardous 
locations.  This is a particularly common problem in studies of poor and/or 
discriminated-against populations, which are routinely portrayed as infinitely more 
vulnerable to displacement than others, objects to be easily swept away by 
environmental forces.  However, drawing a direct relationship between income (or other 
such measures) and vulnerability fails to account for the more particular forms of 
differentiation that affect such populations in ways that may not necessary predispose 
them to flee a hazardous location.   
In a slight aside, it is worth noting that the tendency to conflate income or 
socioeconomic status with vulnerability to “displacement” has its roots in the dominant 
episteme of modern capitalist society.  As Agnew writes, “by dint of living in a society 
in which the metric of economic transactions, exchange value, is the dominant measure 
of worth, people come to accept it, use it as a natural measure of place-valuation and 
place definition” (Angew 34).  While it is never possible to fully capture and represent 
the motivating factors behind each household’s migration decision, this thesis goes 
beyond (but does not neglect) income-based measures.  It also considers the effect of 
more specific forms of social organization—mainly race relations, social networks and 
access to public information—on evacuation behavior.  Such an approach is expected to 
shed light on the ways that axes of macro-structural inequality interact with other 
socially and geographically contingent factors (e.g. culture, place attachment, climate 
degree of flood risk).  
 
8 
The Sociology of Disaster 
Sociologists of disaster have made important inroads establishing the 
importance of social structure and cultural norms in determining the outcome of 
environmental events.  Hewitt (1983), for example, writes that disasters expose the 
“characteristic rather than accidental features of the places and societies where they 
occur” (Hewitt 25).  By tracing the root of disasters to the conditions of everyday life in 
a society or social group, Hewitt’s argument suggests that explanations of disasters 
must be grounded in an appreciation of historical and contemporary social conditions 
and processes. 
This imperative to historicize and contextualize disasters can be traced to the 
earliest sociologists of disaster.  Quarantelli (1978), for instance, argued that “natural 
disasters”—in contrast to purely “physical events”—were defined by both their social 
impact and the subsequent social response to that impact.  More recent scholars have 
gone further to suggest that social processes and conditions themselves contribute to the 
very occurrence of disasters.  Working along these lines, Mileti (2001) writes 
 
Many disaster losses—rather than stemming from unexpected events—
are the predictable result of interactions among three major systems: the 
physical environment, which includes hazardous events; the social and 
demographic characteristics of the communities that experience them; 
and the buildings, roads, bridges, and other components of the 
constructed environment (Mileti 3). 
 
In some ways echoing Mileti, Morrow (1999) lays out another particularly helpful 
conceptualization of natural disasters, saying, 
 
The impact of a natural event on any given community…is not random, 
but determined by everyday patterns of social interaction and 
organization, particularly the resulting paradigms which determine 
access to resources… The effect on any particular household, therefore, 
results from a complex set of interacting conditions, some having to do 
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with geography and location, some with dwelling, and still others with 
the social and economic characteristics of the people living there 
(Morrow 2). 
 
Both authors suggest that as the economy and built environment evolve in step with 
development and demographic changes, so does a society’s relation to its “natural” 
environment.   
This type of perspective stands in contrast to the common tendency to reduce a 
given disaster to a certain “defining” factor.  Many of these reductionist arguments 
place undue stress on the construction of technological “defenses” against natural 
forces.  For instance, in accounts of Hurricane Katrina, some scholars focused solely on 
the integrity of the levees (e.g. Kintisch 2005) or the design/use of public transportation 
systems (e.g. Colton 2006).  Such accounts tend to operate on the basis of a narrow 
cost-benefit logic.  For example, a civil engineer writing in the wake of the South Asian 
tsunami argues, “a better balance needs to be achieved between potential losses, in 
human and economic terms, from natural disasters and expenditures on infrastructure 
protection” (Uddin 6).  While levees, earthquake-resistant buildings, public 
infrastructure, and other technologies undoubtedly have a critical role to play, techno-
centric perspectives neither appreciate the political economy that shapes the 
development and distribution of such technologies, nor the micro-level factors that 
shape the behavior of social actors in disaster contexts. 
Sociological accounts of disaster also counter environmental reductionist 
explanations.  From this view, hazards are defined by whether or not “fluctuations” in 
some natural variable(s) “exceed some critical threshold beyond the ‘normal’ band of 
tolerance” (Smith 10).  This perspective relies heavily on meteorological records to 
develop probabilistic models of risk.  Such approaches lead to warnings, for example, of 
increasingly destructive hurricanes as climate change contributes to unusually high 
10 
ocean water temperatures (Emanuel 2005).   Despite the importance of such insights, 
they fail to consider the social processes that make environmental change a threat to 
society in the first place.  For instance, this perspective cannot explain why some 
Category 3 Hurricanes have a greater impact than Category 5 storms, or why a 7.0-
strength earthquake leads to more destruction than an 8.0.  Indeed, this view does not 
adequately consider the processes that shape the distribution of the population and the 
resources needed to mitigate natural hazards.  For example, when considering the 
coastal risks associated with climate change, one must account for the processes leading 
to an unequal distribution of the world’s population in coastal areas, as well as the 
causes of disproportionate coastal urbanization in low-income countries (Jiang and 
Hardee 2009). 
In contrast to the two extreme positions noted above, a more satisfactory 
understanding of disaster can be achieved by considering hazardous natural processes 
and technological “defenses” in the context of social dynamics.  To avoid the various 
types of reductionism that are found within the literatures cited above, this thesis 
synthesizes various areas of theoretical and substantive research across the fields of 
social demography-migration studies, environmental sociology, disaster research, and 
the political geography of place.  Although the secondary nature of the data analyzed in 
this thesis imposed a number of key limitations on the framework utilized in this thesis, 
the attention to the role of social networks is an initial step toward a perspective on 
migration that transcends (but still includes) social structure and/or environmental push 
factors. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 With these broader issues in mind, the following pages draw upon previous 
theoretical and empirical work to advance toward a more specific set of research 
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questions and develop a framework for analyzing evacuation behavior.  As mentioned 
above, this review will draw upon insights from migration studies, environmental 
sociology, the sociology of disaster, and the political geography of place to consider 
why some residents of the Gulf Coast did not evacuate before Hurricane Katrina struck.  
Together, insights from these literatures will help address this multi-dimensional and 
multi-scalar issue, which ranges from the individual, perceptive level to that at which 
social and spatial structures are reproduced. 
 
The Sociology of Migration: Why Social Networks Matter 
Theoretically and substantively, studies of migration serve as the key point of 
departure for this thesis.  Migration scholars have gone furthest to explain the causes 
and consequences of migration—and thus, conversely, non-migration.  In particular, 
this research will draw upon the theoretical insights of work that examines the role of 
social relations and networks in shaping migration decisions (e.g. Massey 1990, Palloni 
et al. 2001).  This research has challenged the assumptions of both neo-classical 
economics and structural-Marxist accounts, moving toward a more flexible, “meso-
level” analysis of migration. 
Although these approaches are multi-scalar in many ways, they take households 
as the primary unit in which migration decisions take place.  This thesis will make the 
same assumption.  Of course, it does not assume that the household behaves 
atomistically; it is itself embedded in various social relations that may facilitate or 
impede mobility.  Indeed, it has been widely recognized that the character of historic 
social ties between locations in a migration network—as well as households’ particular 
relation to those networks—plays a fundamental role in mobility decisions.  As Boyd 
(1989) explains,  
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Whether migration occurs or not is conditioned by historically generated 
social, political and economic structures of both sending and receiving 
societies.  These structures are channeled through social relationships 
and social roles, which impact on individuals and groups (Boyd 642). 
 
Taking a slightly different, but nonetheless helpful approach, Portes (1995) suggests 
that social networks, as well as the structures and norms they engender, alter the 
economic calculus of migration decisions.  He writes, 
 
Social networks are among the most important types of structures in 
which economic transactions are embedded.  These are sets of recurrent 
associations between groups of people linked by occupation, familial, 
cultural, or affective ties.  Networks are important in economic life 
because they are sources for the acquisition of scarce means…and 
because they simultaneously impose constraints on the unrestricted 
pursuit of personal gain  (Portes 8). 
 
In addition to the various obligations and affective relationships involved in networks, 
these relations have also been shown to provide both “information” (Winters, de Janvry, 
and Sadoulet 2001) and “direct assistance” (e.g. shelter, transportation) related to 
migration.  These factors are also expected to be important in a disaster context. 
Drawing back on Granovetter’s (1973) seminal work, it is important to 
distinguish between “strong”, intensive ties and the “weak” ties that constitute extensive 
social networks.  He defines this notion of ties’ strength by writing, “the strength of a tie 
is a…combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy…and the 
reciprocal services which characterize the tie” (Granovetter 1361).  The character of a 
given relation, and the composition of an individual, household, and community’s 
portfolio of relations, has important consequences for the type of social resources they 
are able to acquire.  As he says, “weak ties, often denounced as generative of alienation 
are here seen as indispensable to individuals' opportunities and to their integration into 
communities; strong ties, breeding local cohesion, lead to overall fragmentation” 
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(Granovetter 1378).  Such social conditions may have important implications for 
community mobilization in times of disaster, as well as for households’ evacuation 
prospects. It suggests that households with a preponderance of “strong ties”, and in 
locations with a high degree of “local cohesion”, may be less able and likely to mobilize 
to evacuate during a disaster than their neighbors with extra-local ties. 
Although the strong and weak tie distinction is extremely important to this 
thesis, it is necessary to clarify, as Lin (1999) does, that networks in themselves are not 
resources.  As he writes, “not all bridges (or network locations) lead to better 
information, influence, social credentials or reinforcement” (Lin 36).  Therefore, 
“network locations should be treated as exogenous variables rather than endogenous 
variables of social capital itself” (Lin 37).  In other words, networks may facilitate the 
acquisition of social resources, but this is highly dependent on the resources of the 
individual or group they are connected to–and of course, whether or not they are (or can 
be) actually utilized.  This suggests a need to carefully consider the relationship 
between networks and socio-economic resources.  Both the specific nature of social 
relations and the milieu in which they are embedded are important determinants of the 
type of resources accessible and/or likely to be accessed. 
Similarly, Entwisle et al. (2007) show the necessity of making a conceptual 
distinction between “networks” and “context”.  The former term defines the “ties 
between individuals and groups of individuals… [which] may involve kinship, 
friendship, neighbor relations, social support, and so forth” (Entwisle et al. 1495).  
“Context”, on the other hand, “relates to the social units within which individuals and 
groups of individuals are contained” (Entwisle et al. 1496).  Networks and contexts 
should be viewed not as mutually exclusive, but interactive or even co-constitutive.  
This is consistent with much of the migration-specific literature, such as Massey’s 
(1990) call for multi-level analysis.  As he writes, “mutually reinforcing 
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interconnections among individual, household, and community level factors lead to the 
cumulative causation of migration” (Massey 18). 
These various insights suggest that migration behavior—including the decision 
to stay—is partly a function of the character of the social networks one is connected to, 
as well as the context in which that network is situated.  Occurring at multiple levels, 
these relationships provide varying degrees of access to important cultural and material 
resources, which help define the limits of what migration behaviors are considered 
possible.  These relations may also have a significant effect on the decisions that 
determine what actual behavior occurs within these limits.  As other scholars have 
shown, heterogeneity of perceptions and interpretations, as well as culturally specific 
notions of rationality, can alter decision-making calculi in ways not captured by 
traditional cost-benefit analysis (Kalberg 1980, Sen 2009).  Since culture and ideology 
are constituted, transmitted, and transformed via social relations, one should expect 
significant differences to arise between households and social groups, depending on the 
type and extent of their ties.    
With these important aspects of social networks in mind, it must be 
acknowledged that a number of unique conditions were in place during Katrina (and 
other acute disasters): the short time period for decision-making; the mandatory 
evacuation order; the threat of extreme environmental push factors; and the imperative 
for risk-minimizing (rather than, say, income maximizing) behavior.  Moreover, 
Katrina-related evacuation was a single instance of (im)mobility, not long term 
migration system.  This is particularly important caveat for Collyer (2005), who claims, 
“social network theory in migration has never claimed to explain the origin of 
migration… [it only explains] the path-dependency of migration systems” (Collyer 
700).   
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Although the role of networks in long-term migration systems will be kept in 
mind for the sake of comparison, it is important to clarify that this thesis does not argue 
that social networks affect evacuation via the same mechanisms as they do decisions 
about long-term mobility.  Nonetheless, it does contend that a perspective attuned to 
social networks remains helpful in understanding the complex of factors affecting 
household evacuation behavior.  With a storm approaching and orders to evacuate, 
individuals and households are faced with a multitude of social and economic dilemmas 
that require prioritization and compromise—processes in which social networks play an 
important role. 
More specifically, the abovementioned insights suggest that social networks 
operate in two important ways.  First, these ties can be expected to have a significant 
effect on the values around which decision-making takes place, as culturally-specific 
norms and values are, at least partially, produced and transmitted through these 
relations.  Moreover, such bonds developed via networks—between people, to 
particular places (home and ‘other’), and between past and present—are likely to be 
accentuated under the test of a disaster, with implications for evacuation behavior.  For 
example, the tight bonds between a household and their neighborhood (as both a social 
and physical unit) may emerge as a major factor in the decision-making process.  Such 
ties may increase the odds of staying, especially when the place and/or group of people 
that a household is “bonded to” are threatened in a disaster. 
Second, social networks also serve as critical conduits for “material” resources, 
which can be of either an economic or social nature.  In crisis situations, such resources 
range from information to transportation, shelter, and possibly even monetary 
assistance.  In this way, networks may alter the costs and benefits of evacuation in a 
more utilitarian way, literally shaping the material costs of the decision to flee or stay. 
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Returning to the broader picture then, the character of a household’s social 
relations can be expected to influence evacuation behavior on both a subjective 
(cultural, perceptional) and objective (material) basis.  In short, networks are key 
determinants of the actual and/or perceived costs and benefits of evacuation and shape 
the very logic upon which such decisions are based. 
 
Networks and Perceptions in Disaster Contexts 
 Previous research provides support for such claims about both migration and 
evacuation.  Considering first the cultural/ideational role of social relations, scholars 
have long reported that imperfect information (e.g. Davanzo 1983) and individual 
perceptions (e.g. Lee 1966) play an important role in shaping migration dynamics (see 
also Massey 2002).  While such false starts and non-starts are costly in a variety of 
ways during long-term migration decisions, the potential consequences are even more 
severe in the case of disaster-related evacuation: such faulty (accurate) information can 
lead to unnecessary evacuations, costly/deadly non-evacuations, or, most desirably, 
optimal outcomes.  Of course, its recipient must also consider such information valid.  
As Perry (1994) writes, “reviews of empirical literature reveal considerable support for 
the notion that evacuation compliance is greatly enhanced if the warning recipient 
believes the pending disaster will result in direct and personal harm” (Perry 89).   
Past work on disasters has highlighted differences in perceptions and the 
reception of information across social groups.  For instance, Perry and Mushkatel 
(1986) found significant differences in the source of information, its perceived 
reliability, and the protective measures taken, between whites, blacks, and Mexican-
Americans in a number of disasters.  Turner et al. (1980) reported that blacks in 
southern California were relatively more fatalistic about earthquakes, while Mexican-
Americans and whites were equally less so.  Others, such as Flynn et al. (1994), have 
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found that risk perception is inversely related to income level (rather than ethnic group), 
which they suggest may be symptomatic of the relatively low levels of control poorer 
people have over their lives.   
It is also worth noting that previous research shows that the effect of previous 
hurricane experience has been a significant, but inconsistent factor in evacuation 
decision-making (e.g. Hutton 1976, Baker 1979, Perry and Greene 1982, Sorensen et al. 
1987, cited in Dash and Gladwin 2007).   In one of the more recent works to address 
this issue, Dow and Cutter (1998) find that a hypothesized “crying wolf” syndrome is 
not supported in a case comparing Hurricanes Betsy and Fran.  Instead, they emphasize 
that people depend more on private, inter-personal information than government 
warnings, thus making previous “false starts” by authorities less important than 
conventional wisdom suggests.  Likewise, Gladwin and Peacock (1997) found no 
significant relationship between past hurricane experience and likelihood of evacuation 
before Hurricane Andrew.  Broadly, these various findings suggest that previous 
experience has an inconsistent effect on evacuation behavior (Baker 1991), and that one 
must distinguish between the effect of unnecessary evacuation and actual storm 
experience on perceptions of risk (Lindell et al. 2005). 
A number of studies on Katrina have touched upon the issue of perceptions. 
Burnside et al. (2007) found that public officials, family and friends, and exposure to 
visual images of actual storm damage each had significant impacts on hypothetical 
evacuation decisions of greater New Orleans residents.  However, previous work by 
Burnside (2006) on the same population noted that demographic variables (age, race, 
education, etc.) were not significant determinants of intended evacuation behavior.  This 
is supported by Elliot and Pais (2006), who show that self-reports of risk perception 
among non-evacuees did not systematically vary by race or class. 
18 
The findings above suggest that risk perception often varies by social group.  
However, studies focused on individual perception are clearly insufficient, in part 
suffering from an overly individualistic approach. The poor explanatory power of such 
approaches is exemplified in findings by Dow and Cutter (2000), in a study of South 
Carolina residents during Hurricane Floyd.  After considering self-reported explanations 
for non-evacuation related to location, perceived safety, and past experience, they were 
still unable to account for a residual of between 33% and 50% (Dow and Cutter 149).  
This suggests that other, truly social factors were at play—confirming once again the 
need to transcend atomistic perspectives of evacuation behavior.  
More broadly, it is important to note that the above findings are quite general in 
nature and do not specify the cultural mechanisms through which these differences 
emerge.  Nor do they suggest that such relationships between demographic variables 
and risk perception are constant over space, time, or in relation to all of the various 
types of risk.  Indeed, other studies (e.g. White 1974, Ives and Furseth 1983) suggest 
that the strength of these relationships is quite variable.  The degree of ambiguity of 
these findings suggests that although attention to risk and information intake must be 
given, they cannot be considered outside the context of a broader constellation of social 
factors. 
 
Race, Class, and Social Organization 
Other research has moved beyond the methodological individualism of social 
psychology to consider the role of social and economic resources in evacuation 
behavior.  For example, other studies have found racial differences in the 
communication of storm and evacuation information.  Perry and Mushkatel (1986) and 
Perry and Nelson (1991) showed that Mexican-Americans used informal social 
networks to communicate disaster-related information more than blacks and whites, 
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both of whom were more likely to use formal news sources.  A similar pattern holds 
true in the case of Hurricane Andrew, for which Morrow (1997) found that blacks and 
Hispanics were most likely to rely on relatives for information.  Such differences are 
expected to have important effects of evacuation behavior, as the timing, quality, and 
perceived reliability of information varies across sources. 
Moving beyond this focus on information, articles by Fothergill et al. (1999) and 
Fothergill and Peek (2004) provide extensive reviews of the many inequalities that often 
characterize natural disasters.  They respectively demonstrate that race and class have 
emerged as significant axes of differentiation in evacuation patterns during some 
(though not all) natural disasters.  A number of other studies have shown that regardless 
of information and perceptions, low-income residents have been systematically less 
likely to find resources to evacuate or make it to shelters (Gladwin and Peacock 1997, 
Morrow and Enarson 1996).  Other empirical evidence largely supports these findings.  
Analyzing evacuation patterns during Hurricane Andrew, Gladwin and Peacock (1997) 
show that income had a statistically significant positive effect on the odds of 
evacuation.  Morrow’s (1997) work on that same event shows that the poorest non-
evacuees were most likely to have stayed because they had no place to go.  However, 
blacks and Hispanics—who were situated in unique positions in the “tripartite [racial] 
division” of Dade County—were still less likely to evacuate than their white neighbors, 
despite living in more vulnerable locations (Greinier and Morrow 47). 
These findings clearly demonstrate the significance of “social structures, which 
dictate access to resources, power, and information” (Fothergill and Peek 104).   
However, the spatially and temporally uneven relationship between race, income, and 
disasters beg us to more fully contextualize these relationships.  For example, Donner 
and Rodriguez (2008) situate race in the context of historical social and economic 
relations.  They explain 
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Recent evidence also suggests that racial and ethnic minorities tend to 
hold lower trust in public institutions when compared to non-Hispanic 
whites…  Accordingly, it is reasonable to hypothesize that that these 
groups may not be willing to seek help beyond a limited informal 
community when confronted with disasters.  Persistent problems with 
chronic poverty, unemployment or underemployment, as well as their 
experiences with discrimination and racism…adversely impact the trust 
of minority groups in institutions that are designed to provide them with 
assistance both generally and at times of disasters specifically (Donner 
and Rodriguez 1099). 
 
This highlights the need to move beyond simple descriptions of race and class to 
understand the more particular conditions that make such categories socially meaningful 
in a given place and at a given time.  This thesis contends that it is not race and class per 
se that are important, but rather a more specific set of local social and cultural 
mechanisms that produce such patterns (and explaining, for example, why Donner and 
Rodriguez observe that some groups were “not willing” to search for alternative sources 
of aid). 
Some previous work has made steps in this direction.  Although many of these 
studies still utilize race and class uncritically, they all attend to more particular forms of 
social organization that underlie race- and class-based disparities.  For example, there is 
evidence that differences in social ties help explain Gladwin and Peacock’s (1997) 
abovementioned observation of racialized evacuation patterns during Hurricane 
Andrew.  More specifically, Morrow (1997) found that black and Hispanic residents 
were significantly more likely to have kin in close proximity before the storm.  
Although they do not report racial or income-based patterns, they also found that 38% 
of residents in an emergency post-storm tent city also had relatives staying in tents, 
which suggests that entire social networks were affected by the storm.  Low-income 
households were also most likely to depend on family and friends for shelter (versus 
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hotels).  Likewise, blacks and Hispanics were significantly more likely to have helped 
family or friends before and (just blacks) after the storm.  Albeit indirectly, these 
findings in the case of Andrew suggest that the possession of (and need to utilize) social 
relations differed significantly between socio-economic groups. 
Similar trends have emerged from work on Katrina.  In a survey of evacuees, 
Spence et al. (2007) report significant black-white differences in sources of evacuation 
information.  Where 56.4% of white respondents reported interpersonal information as 
“very important”, 74.6% of blacks and 77.1% of other non-whites did so (Spence et al. 
547).  Comparing specific Vietnamese and black neighborhoods in New Orleans, Li et 
al. (2008) reach similar conclusions, finding that blacks were more likely to rely on 
media or family than the government (Li et al. 275).  
 Airriess et al. (2008) found that although community-based social capital among 
Vietnamese residents of New Orleans was not a key factor in obtaining information 
about the storm, it did play a significant role in the actual process of evacuation (as well 
as return, and recovery).  Drawing on a broader survey of Katrina-effected areas across 
the Gulf, Elliot and Pais (2006) found that race was a significant determinant of 
evacuation behavior in non-metro areas, with blacks significantly less likely to leave.  
In the city, however, income was the strongest (positive) and most consistent predictor 
of evacuation—although the small subset of the population that reported never leaving 
was almost entirely black.   
 Others have provided insight into the question of evacuation behavior in New 
Orleans.  For example, a study by Haney et al. (2007) used the same Gallup data as 
Elliot and Pais to understand household evacuation strategies, including how they 
varied across race and income.  They report that wealthier households were more likely 
than others to evacuate in unison, with household income having a statistically 
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significant negative effect on staying by division.1  The income effect on staying in 
unison was also negative, but significantly weaker.  On the other hand, blacks were less 
likely than whites to leave in unison, tending to either stay in unison or divide in some 
way.  This suggests that blacks were, on average, more inclined to maintain at least 
some tie to home—even if the situation was perceived as dangerous enough to have 
some household members flee.  Notably, however, Haney et al. explicitly note that they 
had “no direct measure of social networks” and therefore simply rely on race as a 
proxy—a highly problematic assumption (Haney et al. 86).  While their reasoning has 
some merit, the conflation of race and network status seems problematic in light of the 
other race-class interactions they observe.   
Taken together, the works of Airriess et al., Elliot and Pais, and Haney et al. 
suggest that networks, race, and class were all important factors in evacuation behavior 
during Hurricane Katrina.  However, the variability between social groups (e.g. the 
Vietnamese) and regions (e.g. New Orleans City and others) suggests that further 
research is needed to explicate the nuanced relationship between these variables and 
behaviors.  This thesis seeks to contribute to this task. 
 
Networks, Nativity, Duration of Residence, and Place 
A promising complement to the works cited above is found in works that 
consider the geographic distribution and temporal duration of social relations.  For 
instance, Barnshaw and Trainor (2007) view Katrina through the lens of social capital, 
writing, 
 
                                                
1 A household was classified as having “stayed in division” if the individual observed in 
the sample stayed, but some household members left; a household was classified as 
having “evacuated in division” if the individual observed in the sample evacuated, but 
some household members stayed. 
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…our focus is on agents’ ability to “cash in” or transform resting 
potential, or social network of loose associations, into beneficial resource 
allocation following a disaster.  Therefore, we aim to better understand 
how preexisting networks in the Katrina catastrophe created situations 
that inhibited the transformation of social capital into tangible resources, 
thus rendering their accumulated social capital either situationally 
useless or detrimental (Barnshaw and Trainor 96).  
 
Despite the potentially problematic economistic view of social capital, this perspective 
takes us beyond the categories of race and class to view socio-economic resources from 
a more nuanced and multi-dimensional perspective.  In contrast to a strictly hierarchical 
and categorical conceptualization of society, this view accounts for the quality (or 
character) of various forms of social capital that individuals and groups may posses, as 
well as how these resources are utilized in particular contexts.  
Although Barnshaw and Trainor characterize their work as “exploratory 
research”—and consequently provide a less-than-rigorous analysis and set of findings—
they report a number of important initial observations.  Foremost, they note, “many 
evacuees reported fragmented or spatially concentrated social networks…”, which 
could not be utilized in the state of crisis during Katrina (Barnshaw and Trainor 102).  
This is precisely the effect of “strong ties” that Granovetter demonstrated.  Many 
evacuees also reported that a lack of financial resources and friends/family outside of 
the state had prevented such movements.  Conversely, those with various combinations 
of financial resources and social networks were able to stay in hotels, apartments, and 
homes after the storm.  However, these latter respondents are shown to be the exception 
rather than the rule, as 79% of evacuees reported they did not have friends or family 
they could move in with until they recovered (Barnshaw and Trainor 104).   
It is likely that for many of those without support, their entire social network 
was affected.  As the authors write, “several interviewees were members of large 
families, sometimes of 20 or more, all of whom lived in New Orleans and Orleans 
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Parish; as a result, all were affected by Hurricane Katrina” (Barnshaw and Trainor 103).  
Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2009) reach similar conclusions, noting, “while transplants 
could rely on extended kin in other parts of the country, large extended families all 
living in New Orleans were unable to render aid to one another as they were all caught 
in the same predicament” (Chamlee-Wright and Storr 626).  These are critical 
observations that have largely been ignored in the literature, especially in relation to the 
attention afforded to car ownership (a concern that reflects a general inability to view 
evacuation as a truly social process).  
Barnshaw and Trainor also noted that for some of their respondents, Katrina-
related evacuation was the first time they had left the state of Louisiana.  This anecdote 
is consistent with the city’s exceptionally high nativity rate: as of the 2000 Census, 
77.4% of New Orleans’ 484,674 residents were born in Louisiana.  This is the highest 
in-state nativity rate among major American cities, and, according to Campanella, has 
an extremely significant degree of social meaning in the city.  In fact, this author has 
argued for an understanding of “nativity as ethnicity” (Campanella 270).  That said, 
Falk (2004) suggests that such “rootedness” can be observed in many black 
communities across the rural South, thus New Orleans may be less of an exception than 
expected. 
It is nonetheless worth noting that the population immobility that characterizes 
New Orleans is particularly salient among the city’s black population.  According to 
Falk et al. (2006), only 3-4% of New Orleans’ black population moved there between 
1995-2000—compared with 15-18% in Atlanta.  This is evidence that “its local Black 
population was essentially reproducing itself from one generation to the next” (Falk et 
al. 120).  It would nonetheless be a mistake to equate race (or class) with nativity and 
‘rootedness’.  As Campanella (2007) writes 
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Mapping out New Orleans’ nativity patterns yields a whole new cultural 
geography compared to standard interpretations based on race, class, and 
other factors.  The stark divide between the mostly black Lower Ninth 
Ward and mostly white St. Bernard Parish completely disappears when 
one plots nativity…  New Orleans East and Westwego seem very 
different when we segment society by race, but quite similar when we do 
so by nativity.  Conversely, Uptown and Lakeview seem the same in 
terms of age and class, but quite different in terms of nativity…” 
(Campanella 272). 
 
This weak correlation between race and ethnicity suggests that the differences in culture 
and processes of socialization are so fundamental between high-native and high-
transplant neighborhoods that racial boundaries may be complicated beyond 
recognition. 
The social significance of nativity has a number of implications for thinking 
about evacuation behavior, particularly in New Orleans.  For one, these population 
characteristics likely enhance the effect of historical events on contemporary culture via 
geographically close, strong intergenerational ties.  For instance, the memory of 
Hurricane Betsy of 1965 remained fresh in the minds of many, as stories of this storm 
have been transmitted and reproduced in step with the city’s population.  As Bullard 
(2008) notes, many accounts of Betsy attribute the flooding of the Ninth Ward and other 
black areas during that storm to the intentional destruction of the particular levees 
protecting these neighborhoods.  As Bullard describes: 
 
Whether a conspiracy rumor or fact, the “Betsy experience” is the 
primary reason many Lower Ninth Ward residents keep hatchets in their 
attics.  This mistrust of government probably saved thousands of lives 
after the levee breach four decades later when Katrina struck in 2005 
(Bullard 761). 
 
This conclusion is supported by Elder et al.’s (2007) study of over fifty black non-
evacuees, in which the history of Betsy and general dissatisfaction with the 
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government—including explicit blame for perceived safety risks (e.g. faulty levees)—
were among the commonly expressed sentiments.   Findings such as these highlight the 
ways that population-level dynamics are implicated in the way that particular historical 
narratives are produced and reproduced.  This, of course, has important consequences 
for evacuation behavior, since such narratives form part of the cultural framework again 
which decisions are made.  These observations should also serve as a reminder that 
there are potentially fruitful opportunities for collaboration between such 
methodologically disparate disciplines as formal demography and anthropology.   
 The second major implication of New Orleans’ high-nativity population relates 
to notions of community, place, and identity.  Many social geographers, such as Agnew 
(1987), Fried (2000), and Gustafson (2001) have shown notions of “place” to be multi-
dimensional and multi-scalar.  For the purposes of this thesis, the most important insight 
provided by these works is that “meanings of place” are often “situated in the 
relationship between self, others, and/or environment, rather than unambiguously 
belonging to just one” (Gustafson 9).  In other words, particular social relationships 
(e.g. kin networks), broader social identities (e.g. neighborhood-, race-, and/or class-
based identity), and personal attachments to a specific location (e.g. a childhood home) 
interact to co-produce “place” as a physical and culturally meaningful concept.   
It can be reasonably assumed that many residents’ deep historical roots in New 
Orleans (or any location in rest of the Gulf) are associated with unique senses of place 
and place-based identity.  As Gustafson (2001) writes, “places often have highly 
personal meanings…places where the respondents have lived for long periods or to 
which they have returned many times are associated with roots and continuity” 
(Gustafson 9).  In one sense, this suggests that concepts of place transcend the actual 
people that inhabit it and claim it is as “their own.”  Indeed, more general 
27 
characteristics—such as historical neighborhood identities, aesthetics, and culture—
may play important roles among social groups and between people and places.   
That said, it is also important to distinguish between nativity and duration of 
residence, since the latter may also have important implications for neighborhood-level 
social organization.  As Sampson and Graif (2009) argue, “residential 
instability…might create disruption of institutional continuity, existing social networks, 
and social cohesion” (Sampson and Graif 1584).  This suggests that the same processes 
that “disrupt” the strong ties of immobile populations may have broader, more negative 
effects on a neighborhood.  In the case of New Orleans, however, the primary question 
will be whether the strong ties, cohesion, and institutions that were likely associated 
with the city’s relatively high degree of residential stability were conducive to, or 
prohibited, timely evacuation behavior. 
 Evidence from New Orleans suggests that, in many respects, social cohesion and 
place attachment remained strong among its residents.  For example, Campanella, notes 
that identities and social actions often coalesce around nativity status.  He writes, “the 
differences between natives and transplants almost seem to form, or at least inform, two 
separate sub-cultures, perhaps even two ethnicities”, forming a line of separation that 
transcends race and class on issues such as urban policy (Campanella 273-4).  Making a 
more specific point, Bond-Graham observes that despite economists and sociologists’ 
common portrayal of communities like the Ninth Ward as oppressive slums, 
“community cohesion and people’s attachment to place has been profoundly powerful 
[there]” (Bond-Graham 5).  Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2009) reach similar 
conclusions.  After an extensive series of interviews of post-Katrina New Orleans 
residents and some non-returning evacuees, they report  
 
Respondents overwhelmingly insist that New Orleans in general (and 
Ninth Ward neighborhoods in particular) possess a unique bundle of 
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characteristics that, when taken together, constitute a sense of place that 
cannot be found or replicated elsewhere...  the Ninth Ward residents’ 
insistence that ‘there’s no place like New Orleans’ is somewhat 
remarkable since, at least for those who have returned, it is overriding 
otherwise negative perceptions that would lead people to abandon plans 
of retuning (Chamlee-Wright and Storr 621, 624). 
 
Although the latter statement suffers from a degree of selectivity bias, Chamlee-Wright 
and Storr’s findings nonetheless demonstrate the intense sense of place that pervaded 
among many of New Orleans’ poorest and most isolated residents.  
While these insights do not adequately address the consequences of these 
communities’ historical and contemporary position relative to mainstream society, they 
highlight the need to carefully distinguish between social isolation or deprivation and 
senses of place and community.  The relationship between these two conditions is 
interactive and dynamic: particular types of cohesion emerge under particular social 
conditions, and with particular consequences.  Illustrating this, Falk (2004) makes an 
important observation about how many blacks in the South have experienced “place” 
vis-à-vis a historically white supremacist society.  Describing why some Southern 
blacks chose to remain in locations subjected to racist discrimination, he writes, “they 
knew well the white power structure and the well-established normative boundaries.  
Thus, black people could navigate their way through everyday life and nearly all 
situations that presented themselves” (Falk 146).  While such insights surely do not 
apologize for racism and discrimination, they provide an important check on commonly 
held views that oversimplify important aspects of residential (and mobility) choices. 
That said, if existing relations and institutions maintain highly unequal power 
relations and systematically limit the social efficacy of some groups, then “continuity” 
and “cohesion” might have negative consequences—in this case, for disaster response.  
Indeed, as Sampson and Morenoff (2006) report, “members of economically and 
29 
racially isolated communities, especially those least able to exercise political influence 
to obtain community services, are more likely than others to report alienation and 
powerlessness” (Sampson and Morenoff 191-2).  This is consistent with Wilson’s 
(1987) notion of “social isolation”, which, he writes, “not only implies that contact 
between groups of different class and/or racial backgrounds is either lacking or has 
become increasingly intermittent, but that the nature of this contact enhances the effects 
of living in a highly concentrated poverty area” (Wilson 61).  With this in mind, one can 
understand that the social cohesion described above may still take place in socially 
isolated and impoverished areas.  Drawing again on Granovetter (1973), such 
communities are characterized by a disproportionate amount of “strong ties”, which 
leave them disconnected and fragmented from other (mainstream) social groups.  The 
consequences of this are often negative—especially when the resources of mainstream 
society are of great importance, as they were during Katrina. 
*** 
As a whole, the literature above highlights the important role that social 
networks play in human mobility generally, and disaster response more specifically.  It 
challenges simplistic claims that stop at race, class, or the ownership of automobiles by 
also considering the role of more complex, less structural measures of social relations 
and organization.  It stresses the multi-scalar nature of social networks, and the 
distribution of cultural and material resources they produce and reproduce across time 
and space.  From individual perceptions to the broader political economy of urban 
spaces, the extent, character, and context of social ties are expected to have significant 
implications for households’ access to the social and economic resources relevant to 
evacuation.  While race- and class-based groups do, almost by definition, have a close 
relation to networks, this review suggests that these categories are not sufficient.   
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Although this thesis cannot consider each of the factors discussed above because 
of data-related limitations, it moves beyond previous work to incorporate measures of 
social networking into its analysis.  This step is expected to be particularly important 
when considering the case of Katrina in New Orleans—a city whose human and 
physical geographies were differentiated by various, intersecting axes of race, class, and 
place-based identities.  The inclusion of both macro-structural (e.g. race, income) and 
micro-level (e.g. household ties, information attainment) variables is expected to 
provide a more nuanced explanation of evacuation dynamics than previous research, 
and shed light on potential avenues for future data collection and analysis. 
 
RESEARCH FOCUS AND STRATEGY 
 The research above has shown that the evacuation process is complex and multi-
scalar, and that the precise effect of race, class, and other independent variables on 
evacuation has varied on a case-by-case basis.  Moreover, this literature shows that 
human mobility—evacuation  in this case—can be studied from a number of 
perspectives and at a number of levels, from micro-level, social psychological factors to 
the broader social structures in which individuals and households are embedded. 
While case studies that focus on one particular dimension of evacuation (e.g. 
individual risk perception, racial differences) are certainly important, the above review 
has shown that a network-oriented perspective has the potential to capture multiple 
dimensions of this process.  Social networks “operate” at the individual and household 
levels by serving as conduits for the cultural and material resources that affect risk 
perceptions, as well as the ability and propensity of households to evacuate.  They also 
work at the neighborhood and macro levels, as the particular constellation of a social 
group’s networks connects (or isolates) these groups in ways that shape their ability to 
mobilize and make claims on public resources.  In instances where class- (or race) 
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based groups become meaningful on both a subjective and objective basis—what Marx 
referred to as a “class for itself”—then network arrangements may align closely with 
these categories.  This, however, is not always the case.   
Networks serve as a bridge by reinforcing (or contradicting) processes and 
conditions across scales, “interacting” or “intersecting” with other variables.  As 
Hanneman and Riddle (2005) put it, a network approach captures the way that “[an] 
individual is embedded within a structure and how the structure emerges from the 
micro-relations between individual parts”.  In short, this perspective is able to capture 
the mutually constitutive relationship between the micro and macro levels.  
 With that in mind, the purpose of this thesis is to understand the effect of 
household networks on evacuation behavior among residents of the Gulf Coast—giving 
particular attention to the city of New Orleans—before Hurricane Katrina.  The primary 
question driving this study asks, “Did the relative extent of a household’s social 
networks affect the likelihood that it would not evacuate?”  Previous research has failed 
to systematically examine the role of household social networks in evacuation behavior 
during Hurricane Katrina—and other disasters more broadly.  By focusing on this 
factor, the thesis will fill these gaps in the research and consider the effect of networks 
in relation to those variables used in previous research.  
The main expectation of this study is that households with many locally 
concentrated social ties were more likely to not evacuate before the storm than 
households with high levels of distant network connections.  Those households with 
low levels of both local and distant ties (socially isolated) are expected to have been the 
least likely to evacuate before the storm.  As previously discussed, the extent of 
household social networks is expected to affect evacuation behavior on both a cultural 
and material basis.  They may influence the logic upon which the evacuation decision is 
based, as well as the tangible costs and benefits that define what behavior is possible or 
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probable.  Moreover, households with many strong, local ties, but without weak, 
extensive ones, may be more likely to be natives of the county, parish, or state that they 
resided in.  Although it would be unwise to classify these network attributes as a proxy 
to nativity (this thesis does not do so), it is possible to state that households with high 
levels of local ties and low levels of distant ties exhibit one of the key characteristics of 
an ideal-typical native. 
This analysis of evacuation behavior will also consider a set of additional factors 
that have been found to have a significant effect in previous research.  Specifically, 
indicators of storm preparation, information attainment, household size, income, and 
race will be included in the data analysis to isolate the effect of social ties.  This is an 
important step beyond previous research, which has failed to move beyond ascribed 
categories and basic measures to consider measures of social networking in analysis of 
evacuation patterns. 
 
DATA AND MEASURES 
This question will be addressed using data from the baseline-year (2006) survey 
of Harvard Medical School’s Hurricane Katrina Community Advisory Group (Kessler 
2009).  The purpose of this study was to “inform policy-makers of the impact of 
Hurricane Katrina on survivors’ physical and mental health… as well as assist in future 
natural disaster planning efforts” (Kessler ii).  Although the survey was designed to 
conduct social psychological research on the physical and mental health dimensions of 
the Hurricane Katrina disaster, it also includes important information about the 
evacuation behavior and demographic characteristics of the survey respondents.  Most 
importantly, it is the only available source data on Katrina that includes measures of 
respondents’ social networks.   
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That said, the secondary nature of this data limited this thesis in a number of 
significant ways.  Foremost, the level of geography at which respondents were 
identified precluded the consideration of a number of potentially important variables, 
and thus limited the interpretations of the findings.  County (parish) and sub-county 
(parish) identifiers would have made it possible to link household data to critical 
information about the context in which households were embedded, such as median 
neighborhood income and nativity rates.  As the literature review suggested, such 
factors may have interacted with households’ social networks to affect evacuation 
behavior.  These variables are tightly linked to notions of “place” that link individuals 
and households to the people, culture, and physical environment of particular locations.  
Hence, such data would greatly strengthen analyses of evacuation behavior by 
accounting for the characteristics of the spatial context in which networks (and other 
variables) are situated. 
The lack of any sub-state identifiers was particularly limiting for the 
interpretation of the non-New Orleans sample: it was not possible to gauge the 
geographic distribution of the respondents across the region (e.g. percent urban/rural), 
nor could I determine whether the respondents were under evacuation orders.  It is thus 
not possible to know whether the patterns in evacuation behavior reflect social 
conditions or simply the geography of Katrina’s impact.  Such indicators would also 
have facilitated an analysis of the mobility decisions that took place during and after the 
storm.   Geocodes could have been linked to other data to account for emergent 
environmental forces (e.g. flooding) and social processes (e.g. forced evacuations) that 
became relevant to mobility decisions during the storm and in its immediate aftermath.   
It should also be noted that the inclusion of these measures would have 
represented a significant step toward the theoretical objective of developing an 
integrated understanding of social and environmental processes.  As noted in the review 
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above, numerous scholars have argued that social and environmental forces must be 
viewed as interactive, and in some instances, co-constitutive.  With the appropriate data, 
this thesis would have considered how environmental risk and actual environmental 
forces (e.g. storm surge, flooding) interacted with social conditions and behavior (e.g. 
recalcitrance to evacuate) to cause particular evacuation behaviors.   
 An additional limitation imposed by the use of secondary data, this analysis had 
to utilize a measure of social networks that was designed with social psychological 
research questions in mind.  The questions asked in the survey used for this study were 
overly broad (e.g. how many friends outside of the county could you count on to share 
personal feelings?), and did not necessarily capture the number of ties that a household 
would rely upon in a time of emergency.  A survey designed to study evacuation 
behavior would develop questions that captured both the generic ties that constitute a 
household’s embeddedness in a community, and the more specific relations that 
factored into that household’s evacuation decision. 
Despite these limitations, this survey provided sufficient information to examine 
the effect of social networks on evacuation behavior during Katrina.  Using a multi-
frame sampling method, the Advisory Group interviewed 1043 adult (ages 18 and over) 
respondents.  The study aimed to acquire two representative samples.  The first included 
pre-storm residents of the New Orleans Metropolitan area; the second consisted of those 
households that lived in the other counties or parishes2 that were declared eligible for 
“individual assistance” by FEMA in the wake of the storm.  As indicated by the 
medium and dark orange-shaded counties in the maps below, these counties and 
parishes were located in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.  The New Orleans 
                                                
2 Counties are administrative units in Alabama and Mississippi; Parishes are the county-
equivalent in Louisiana.  
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metropolitan sample netted 594 respondents, while the sample of the remaining counties 
and parishes included 449 respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 1: Parish FEMA Status, Louisiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 2: County FEMA Status, Alabama 
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Map 3: County FEMA Status, Mississippi 
 
Drawing upon “safe lists”, an American Red Cross relief list, hotel registers, and 
random digit dialing, respondents were questioned via telephone interview.  Of those 
households that were reached, 97.0% agreed to join the Advisory Group for this 
longitudinal study.  After this initial contact and agreement, respondents were randomly 
selected among eligible adults in the household.  It is important to note that the sample 
was limited by a set of criteria that excluded 6-8% of the sample frame: respondents had 
to speak English or Spanish, been physically and mentally able to participate in an 
interview, and have access to a telephone.  Although it may be self evident, the 
sampling frame also included deceased respondents—all of whom would be considered 
“non-evacuees” in this study. 
Respondents answered an extensive set of open- and close-ended questions.  The 
open-ended questions were recorded as “oral histories”, which were not included in the 
data set being utilized (although it holds much promise for future research).  All 
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respondents answered on behalf of their household, thus each case will be treated as a 
household.  As discussed above, the analyses in this thesis assume the household to be 
the primary unit at which evacuation decisions are made. 
Combining these sub-samples, the total 1043 respondents will be taken as the 
initial universe for data analysis.  In addition to considering the effect of social 
networks on evacuation in this large sample, the inclusion of a geographic variable will 
examine the effect of living in (a) the New Orleans metropolitan area relative to living 
in (b) the remaining parishes and counties in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.  
Before proceeding, it is necessary to make a number of clarifications regarding 
the variables used in this analysis.  The following section will discuss the definition and 
construction of the dependent and independent variables, giving specific reference to 
the survey instrument used in this study. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Evacuation Status: Evacuee status will be defined according to whether the 
household evacuated before the storm, during it, after it, or never at all.  Information on 
this behavior was obtained from responses to the following question: 
 
Did you evacuate to a safe place outside the hurricane area before 
Katrina hit? 
 
Households will be placed into one of two categories depending on their actions: (1) 
“evacuated before” or (2) “evacuated eventually or never”.  Although one could treat 
those that eventually evacuated separately from those that never evacuated, this is a 
qualitatively different decision than whether or not to evacuate before the storm.  
Indeed, a separate analysis not included in this thesis demonstrated that the framework 
and variables utilized in this study does not adequately account for the difference in 
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these two sub-groups.  Hence, this thesis focuses only on the pre-storm evacuation 
decision and therefore merges the households that “evacuated eventually” and “never 
evacuated” into a single “evacuated eventually or never” group. 
 
Independent Variables 
Social Networks: The social network variable—the focus of this thesis—
accounts for the level of both intensive and extensive social network connections 
possessed by a household.  This variable is based upon a simple four-box typology (see 
below), which categorizes households according to the relative extent of their networks.  
These measures were obtained from responses to the following two questions: 
 
About how many friends or relatives in the county/parish were you close 
enough to that you could talk about your private feelings without feeling 
embarrassed? 
 
About how many friends or relatives who did not live in the 
county/parish were you close enough to that you could talk about your 
private feelings without feeling embarrassed? 
 
This relative measure of social networks (inside vs. outside county/parish) is more 
appropriate for an analysis of evacuation behavior than an indictor of absolute network 
extent since the objective is to move outside the county or parish under evacuation 
orders rather than to move as far as possible.  For instance, having a relative in New 
York City was not necessarily an asset for evacuation, especially if the household in 
New Orleans could not afford to make that trip. 
This four-category variable was constructed by dividing responses to the 
abovementioned questions according to a simply dichotomous classification: reports of 
0-4 ties were considered “low”, with those of 5+ considered “high”.  The line 
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partitioning these categories was based on both substantive meaning and the distribution 
of responses.  The median response to the above questions were 5.0 and 3.0, 
respectively; hence 4.0 provides an optimal central point to create these binary 
categories around.  Moreover, this particular division provided an adequate number of 
respondents when each network category was broken down in a contingency table 
comparing evacuees and non-evacuees. 
 
 Distant Networks 
 Low (0-4) High (5+) 
Low (0-4) A B Local Networks 
High (5+) C D 
Figure 1: Social Network Variable Grouping Scheme 
 
After classifying households’ levels of both local and distant ties, the variable used in 
this study distinguishes between households that had: (1) low levels of both local and 
distant ties (Group A); (2) high levels of distant ties and low levels of local ties (Group 
B); (3) low levels of distant ties and high levels of local ties (Group C); and (4) high 
levels of both local and distant ties (Group D).  Group D is the most embedded, while 
Group A is socially isolated.  Group C is embedded locally, but lacks ties to the outside; 
Group B is embedded extra-locally, but lacks local ties.  This method of categorization 
captures the aspect of social networks that is most important for this study: the relative 
distribution of households’ local and distant networks. 
 
Race: A dichotomous race variable distinguishes between black and white 
populations. Respondents could have also identified themselves as Hispanic or “other”, 
but these groups are excluded from analysis in order to focus on the black-white 
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cleavage.  Hispanics and “Others” (e.g. Vietnamese) have unique positions vis-à-vis 
both blacks and whites in New Orleans and other affected areas, making it problematic 
to group them into a single “racial minority” group with blacks.  Moreover, the 
relatively small sample size of these groups precludes robust statistical analysis of their 
evacuation behavior.  When contingency tables of evacuation outcomes and 
independent variables are constructed for these groups, many cell counts are extremely 
small or zero, which artificially inflates coefficient estimates and standard errors 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow 129).  Removing Hispanics and others excluded 6.4% of the 
combined sample. 
 
Income:  The household income reported by respondents was transformed into a 
four-part categorical variable.  These categories represent four different ranges of the 
ratio of household income to the poverty line, which has the added benefit of 
controlling for household size.  These four groups are as follows: (1) less than or equal 
to 1.5; (2) less than or equal to 3.0; (3) less than or equal to 6.0; and (4) greater than 6.0.   
 
Educational Attainment:  Unlike the other variables, the education measure 
accounts for the respondent, rather than characterizing the entire household.  This 
maintains the possibility that one or more members of the household could have a 
higher (lower) level of educational attainment than the respondent.  It is nonetheless an 
essential component of this analysis, as education serves as another important 
dimension of socioeconomic status (in addition to self-reported income).  Not only is 
education less prone to measurement error (e.g. heaping of self-reported income), but it 
also has a substantively different meaning: where income represents an 
individual/households’ ability to acquire material resources and services, education 
represents both income-generating potential and that individual/household’s cognitive 
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and social abilities.  The latter are certainly critical when navigating the “system” of 
mainstream society, which includes the logistical necessities of evacuation.  
Respondents’ levels of education attainment were transformed into four categories: (1) 
did not graduate from high school; (2) high school diploma or GED; (3) some college; 
and (4) Associates degree or greater.   
 
Household Size: Household size is represented by a measure of the number of 
non-respondents reported to have been in the household at the time of the storm.  
Original responses ranged from 0 to 10, but these levels were truncated to maintain an 
appropriate frequency distribution for regression analysis.  More specifically, responses 
of 5 to 10 were too infrequent to be analyzed as individual categories or as a combined 
5-10 category; hence they were merged with responses of 4 into a 4+ group.  Due to the 
limited range of responses, this variable was treated categorically, and broken down as 
follows: (1) 0 (16.4% of sample); (2) 1 (30.1%); (3) 2 (17.8%); (4) 3 (19.9%): and (5) 
4+ (15.8%).  
 
Storm-related Variables: Three variables were included to represent storm-
related processes: information attainment and preparation behavior.  First, a binary 
variable indicating the level of households’ storm preparation was derived from the 
question,  
 
Did you pack three days of food and water in preparation for the 
hurricane?  
 
It is important to note that this behavior was identified as an “evacuation preparation” 
measure in the survey.   
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A second variable accounts for the amount of warning time that households had 
before the storm struck.  This measure was obtained from responses to the question, 
 
How soon before hurricane Katrina hit did you first hear it might be 
coming? 
 
Lastly, the number of evacuation preparedness recommendations that households saw 
or heard was collected through responses to the question, 
 
When they first accounted the fact that Katrina was coming, local TV, 
radio, and newspapers told people four things they should do to prepare 
for the hurricane…  About how many times did you hear or see a TV, 
radio, or print message that gave these four evacuation preparedness 
recommendations before Katrina? 
 
Both of these latter variables were transformed to categorize responses as  
“low”, “medium”, and “high”.  The range for each of these classifications was 
established according to the distribution of responses (to maintain a near-even 
distribution across a tripartite division), and broken down as follows: 0-4 
evacuation warnings were classified as “low” (23.6% of respondents), 5-15 
warnings as “moderate” (32.3%), and 16+ as high (44.1%); warning time of less 
than 48 hours was considered “low” (26.6%); 2-6 days warning “moderate” 
(33.4%); and more than 6 days “high” (40%).3   
 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
 To estimate the effect of social networks and other factor on the likelihood of 
non-evacuation before Hurricane Katrina, binary logistic regression is utilized.  This 
                                                
3 The median warning time was 4 days; the median number of evacuation warnings was 
12.  Hence, the mean of the “moderate” level of both warning time and number of 
evacuation warnings is an approximate of the overall median. 
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statistical method has a number of advantages for this and other studies of the 
populations affected by Katrina more generally (Stringfield 2010).  The outcome 
variable in logistic regression is always dichotomous, and the analysis is based upon the 
binomial—not normal—distribution (Hosmer and Lemshow 1989).  The additional 
assumptions upon which logistic regression is based are also quite flexible.  For 
example, unlike linear regression, it does not assume normally distributed variables or 
homoscedasticity.  In this analysis, which includes only categorical independent 
variables, the most important assumptions are: (a) adequate sample size; (b) an adequate 
frequency distribution of cases across the dependent-independent contingency tables; 
and (c) an absence of multicollinearity.  
The basic logit model is as follows: 
z = log (pi/1-pi) = B0 + B1X1 + B2X2 +…+ BkXik 
In this equation, B0 is the constant and Bk is the effect of a unit change in Xik on z, the 
log odds of the dependent variable (Hosmer and Lemshow 1989, Hori and Shafer 
2010).  The output from the SPSS (18.0.2) statistical software utilized in this study 
displays results in terms of odds ratios.  Thus, a coefficient above 1.000 indicates that, 
holding all else constant, the odds of staying for the group signified by variable x are 
greater than the reference group; a coefficient of less than 1.000 indicates that the group 
is more likely to have evacuated.       
As indicated previously, the objective of this study is to develop models 
predicting the odds of not leaving before the storm.  This assumes that evacuating 
eventually and never evacuating are both problematic from a policy standpoint.  Either 
of these outcomes is likely to increase the amount of public resources needed for rescue 
or other assistance.  Delayed evacuation and outright staying also increase the amount 
of risk that these households are exposed to, thus increasing the likelihood of storm-
related causalities.  Understanding the sociological factors behind both of these two 
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sub-optimal outcomes may provide insight relevant to those concerned with evacuation 
compliance.  Accordingly, evacuation was set as the reference category in the logistic 
regression, to be compared with the combined delayed evacuation and non-evacuation 
outcome. 
This comparison will begin with an examination of the full/combined sample of 
all respondents in both New Orleans and the other storm affected areas. Separate 
analyses of the New Orleans metropolitan and non-New Orleans metropolitan area 
samples will be conducted if significant differences in evacuation behavior are found—
as indicated by a significant coefficient on the variable signifying New Orleans/non-
New Orleans location.  For the analysis of each sample, a series of models will be 
constructed, beginning with a simple bivariate model in which the social network 
variable predicts evacuation behavior.  Using this as a base, each additional model will 
add a set of theoretically relevant variables: socioeconomic, demographic, and storm 
related.  Although each iteration of this model-building process will not be presented in 
this thesis, significant attention will be given to the potential presence of significant 
interaction effects.  That said, only statistically significant interaction effects will be 
included in the results presented in this thesis.  
 
Expected Relationships 
 Before describing and discussing the analyses and results in more depth, this 
section will clarify the expected effect of each independent variable on the likelihood of 
evacuating late or staying.  This is particularly critical since the model-building process 
utilized in this thesis involves the inclusion of only theoretically important variables, 
rather than simply determining those that simply “fit” from a statistical perspective.  
Although the significance and goodness-of-fit of individual variables and overall 
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models will be central to the interpretation of these results, the realm of possible 
variables will be bounded by theory and previous empirical research. 
 The table below indicates the expected effect of each of the independent 
variables on the odds of evacuating compared with not evacuating.   
 
Table 1: Expected Effect of Independent Variables 
Variable Expected Effect on Odds of “Staying” 
Networks 
(High Local, Low Distant) 
(Low Local, High Distant) 
(High Local, High Distant) 
 
+ 
- 
- 
Location 
(Non-New Orleans Metro) 
 
(New Orleans City) 
+ 
 
N.S. 
Race (Black) + 
Income (Low) + 
Education (Low) + 
Household Size  
(Small) - 
Storm Preparation  
(No) + 
Warning Time  
(Low) + 
Number of Evacuation 
Warnings 
(Low) 
+ 
 
Low levels of distant network ties are expected to positively affect the odds that 
households did not evacuate before the storm or at all.  Thus, households with either 
low levels of both local and distant ties (social isolation) or high levels of local ties and 
low levels of distant ties are expected to have the highest odds of staying or delaying 
evacuation.  Both arrangements of networks may have impeded (facilitated) household 
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evacuation “materially”—making it less possible—as well as “culturally”—making it 
less likely.   
Location outside the New Orleans metropolitan area is expected to exert a 
positive effect on non-evacuation in the models of the full sample. Although the 
counties and parishes that comprise the universe of this study contained a large 
proportion of the 1.2 million Gulf Coast residents under some type of evacuation order, 
not all were mandatory, nor was the physical threat of the storm distributed evenly 
across the sampling frame.  For example, as maps published on the FEMA website (not 
included) demonstrate, flood height and storm impact varied across the region.  Hence, 
even when accounting for all of the factors included in this analysis, residents of the 
non-New Orleans region are expected to have been more likely to have not evacuated 
before the storm due to lesser political and environmental imperatives to evacuate. 
If the location (New Orleans/non-New Orleans) variable is significant in the full 
model, separate analyses of the New Orleans metropolitan and non-New Orleans 
metropolitan samples would be merited.  In this case, an additional geographic variable 
distinguishing between New Orleans City and suburbs will be incorporated into the 
New Orleans metropolitan area analysis.  This variable is expected to have an 
insignificant effect, as evacuation orders were in place across both regions.  Moreover, 
there are no other social conditions that are expected to differentiate the evacuation 
behavior of these populations when controlling for the other independent variables in 
the models.  However, it is possible that unexplained differences may still emerge 
between these two regions—hence it is necessary to include this variable in the analysis. 
Households of lower socioeconomic status—in this instance black, low-income, 
and/or low-education—are expected to have been more likely to delay evacuation or 
never evacuate.  As discussed above, previous research suggests that socioeconomic 
status is positively associated with the ability and/or propensity of households to 
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evacuate (or engage in behaviors critical to the evacuation process) (e.g. Fothergill et al. 
1999, Fothergill and Peek 2004).  Although the character and causes of the inequalities 
that emerge in disasters are context-specific, they tend to reflect differences in 
economic conditions, social and cultural integration, and relations to the state. 
Drawing upon a basic assumption about the material cost of evacuating, 
additional household members should increase the odds that a household stayed or 
delayed evacuating.  Simply put, a ten-member household is more economically and 
logistically difficult to evacuate than a two-member household.  Despite this 
expectation, this analysis will give specific attention to the possibility that the 
relationship between household size and evacuation behavior is not linear, but that there 
is an optimal household size for evacuation.  In that instance, households above and 
below that size would both be more likely to have evacuated eventually or never 
evacuate. 
Lastly, each of the three storm preparation variables, which contrast low to high 
(control) levels of preparation, is expected to have a positive effect on staying.  A lack 
of storm preparation is expected to represent a low level of household awareness of and 
engagement with the development of the storm and government 
recommendations/orders.  Similarly, low levels of warning time and evacuation 
warnings are expected to increase the odds of staying, since these households had less 
time to validate this knowledge and act upon it (e.g. by preparing). 
 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
   The analytic portion of this thesis examines the differences between the 
population that evacuated before Hurricane Katrina and that which delayed evacuation 
or never evacuated.  As explained above, the entire pooled sample will be analyzed 
first, with the results determining the need for separate analyses of the New Orleans and 
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non-New Orleans samples.  In the event that a significant geographic difference 
emerges, the two sub-samples will also be analyzed separately to address the possibility 
that a different set of factors shaped evacuation behavior in each. 
 The frequency table below breaks down each variable by category for the 
combined, full sample and both sub-samples.  After removing respondents who 
identified themselves as Hispanic and an “Other” racial group and deleting incomplete 
cases listwise (to assure that the samples included only respondents who answered all 
relevant questions), the full sample totaled 848 respondents (18% missing).  After 
utilizing the same deletion strategy, the New Orleans and non-New Orleans samples 
totaled 395 (33% missing) and 375 (16%), respectively.  It should be noted that the 
discrepancy between the size of the full sample and the sum of the two sub-samples is 
due to the difference in the geographic variable that was added to the New Orleans 
sample.   
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Table 2: Summary of Independent Variables 
 
It should also be noted that a two-sample chi-square test was performed for each 
of the response variables in each of the samples.  As the table below shows, statistically 
Independent Variable
N % of Category N % of Category N % of Category
Social Networks
Low Local, Low Distant 395 37.9% 208 35.0% 187 41.6%
High Local, High Distant 343 32.9% 214 36.0% 129 28.7%
Low Local, High Distant 89 8.5% 50 8.4% 39 8.7%
High Local, Low Distant 183 17.5% 102 17.2% 81 18.0%
Geographic
Non-New Orleans Metro 449 43.0% N/A N/A N/A N/A
New Orleans Metro 594 57.0% N/A N/A N/A N/A
New Orleans City N/A N/A 168 28.3% N/A N/A
Other New Olreans Metro N/A N/A 426 71.7% N/A N/A
Race
White 707 67.8% 411 69.2% 296 65.9%
Non-Hispanic Black 270 25.9% 144 24.2% 126 28.1%
Income
Income:Poverty <1.5 288 27.6% 120 20.2% 168 37.4%
Income:Poverty =  1.5-3 283 27.1% 159 26.8% 124 27.6%
Income:Poverty = 3-6 304 29.1% 197 33.2% 107 23.8%
Income:Poverty >6 168 16.1% 118 19.9% 50 11.1%
Education
Less than HS Education 154 14.8% 68 11.4% 86 19.2%
HS or GED 320 30.7% 184 31.0% 136 30.3%
Some College 256 24.5% 141 23.7% 115 25.6%
Associates or more 313 30.0% 201 33.8% 112 24.9%
Demographics
Add. Members HH = 0 171 16.4% 108 18.2% 63 14.0%
Add. Members HH = 1 314 30.1% 205 34.5% 109 24.3%
Add. Members HH = 2 186 17.8% 115 19.4% 71 15.8%
Add. Members HH = 3 208 19.9% 107 18.0% 101 22.5%
Add. Members HH = 4+ 164 15.7% 59 9.9% 105 23.4%
Storm-related 
Evac. preparation = yes 658 63.1% 342 57.6% 130 29.0%
Evac. preparation = no 378 36.2% 248 41.8% 316 70.4%
Warning time = low 279 26.7% 189 31.8% 90 20.0%
Warning time = med. 349 33.5% 216 36.4% 133 29.6%
Warning time = high 382 36.6% 170 28.6% 212 47.2%
Evac. warnings = low 246 23.6% 157 26.4% 89 19.8%
Evac. warnings = med. 337 32.3% 181 30.5% 156 34.7%
Evac. warnings = high 370 35.5% 194 32.7% 176 39.2%
Listwise N 848 395 375
Pooled Sample New Orleans Sample Non-New Orleans Sample
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significant differences in the distribution of a number of independent variables were 
observed when comparing the New Orleans and non-New Orleans samples.  This 
provides preliminary evidence that separate analyses of these two samples may be 
necessary. 
Table 3: Results of Chi-Square Test 
 
Evacuation Before the Storm vs. During, After, or Never: Full Sample 
 The contingency table below provides the marginal percentages and totals of the 
independent variables according to their evacuation status.  These figures provide 
critical insight into the bivariate relationship between each independent variable and 
evacuation behavior.  By comparing the distribution of evacuees and non-evacuees 
among households in each category of the independent variable, a preliminary 
indication of the strength and direction of the association between the respective 
variables and evacuation outcomes can be ascertained. 
With respect to the focus of this thesis—social networks—the table 
demonstrates that households with high levels of distant ties were most likely to have 
evacuated before the storm: those with low levels of local and distant ties had a similar, 
near-even distribution of evacuees and non-evacuees as those with high levels of local 
ties and low levels of distant ties.  This stood in contrast to the remaining households, 
which had either a low level of local ties and high level of distant ties or high levels of 
Variable
Pearson Chi-
Square Value p Value
Social Networks 7.230 .065*
Race 1.834 0.176
Income 47.252 .000***
Education 17.430 .001**
Additional Household Members 45.396 .000***
Evacuation Preparation 18.200 .000***
Warning Time 40.465 .000***
Number of Evacuation Warnings 8.717 .013**
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001
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both types of ties.  Almost two-thirds of the respondents in these latter two categories 
evacuated before the storm, a finding consistent with the expectation that households 
with high levels of distant ties were more likely to evacuate before the storm than 
others.   In other words, this bivariate analysis provides evidence that the level of distant 
ties is a strong predictor of evacuation behavior.  
 Differences also emerge when comparing the race, class, and education statuses 
of evacuees and non-evacuees.  A greater percentage of black respondents evacuated 
after the storm or never at all (51.9%) than before it (48.1%).  This contrasts with 
whites, of whom 60.5% evacuated before the storm (39.5% eventually or never).  A 
similar pattern of stratification is evident in the breakdown of income and education 
variables.  A majority (54.7%) of the lowest income households did not evacuate before 
the storm, nor did 55.8% of those represented by the least-education respondents.  More 
than half of the households in all other income and education categories evacuated 
before the storm, with the proportion of evacuees positively associated to both income 
and education.   As hypothesized, both sets of figures suggest that socioeconomic status 
is negatively related to the odds of staying. 
 The breakdown of evacuation status across household sizes shows that a 
majority of 1-to-4 person households evacuated before the storm, with little variability 
in the distribution of evacuees and non-evacuees across these categories.  However, the 
distribution reverses markedly for households of 5 or more people, of whom 54.6% did 
not evacuate before the storm.  Although this is only one of five categories, it is 
nonetheless consistent with the notion that the logistic and economic costs of evacuation 
for very large households reduce their likelihood of evacuation.  In other words, the 
effect of household size is not linear; rather, there is a size threshold for evacuation. 
 Among the storm-related variables that were analyzed, evacuation preparation 
and warning time deserve comment.  Households that did not prepare by packing three 
52 
days of food and water were much more likely to evacuate prior to the storm (68.1%) 
compared with non-evacuees (31.9%)—which stands in contrast to the even distribution 
of evacuees and non-evacuees among those that did prepare.  Speculatively, this 
suggests that many households took this measure as a means of preparing to stay and 
“ride out the storm”—rather than an evacuation preparation strategy as the survey 
designers expected.   
The breakdown of warning time runs contrary to conventional wisdom: 
households with low and moderate levels of warning time were more likely to have 
evacuated before the storm than those with high levels.  Of course, these differences 
may be explained by other factors—a possibility that will be explored in multivariable 
analysis below. 
 Perhaps the starkest differences emerged when the geographic distribution of 
evacuees is compared to that of non-evacuees.  A much higher percentage of 
households living in the New Orleans metropolitan area before Katrina evacuated 
before the storm (77.9%) than those living in the remaining counties and parishes 
(30.6%).  This likely reflects differences in issuance of evacuation warnings and the 
physical impact of the storm.  It certainly provides an initial reason to believe that a 
strong understanding of evacuation behavior will require separate analyses of these two 
sub-samples.    
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Table 4: Contingency Table, Full Sample  
Independent Variables by Evacuation Status: Full Sample 
Social Networks 
Evacuated 
Before       
% 
Evacuated 
Before      
N 
Evacuated 
Eventually/Never        
% 
Evacuated 
Eventually/Never        
N 
Low Local, Low Distant 53.9% 212 46.1% 181 
High Local, High Distant 62.5% 213 37.5% 128 
Low Local, High Distant 62.5% 55 37.5% 33 
High Local, Low Distant 53.0% 97 47.0% 86 
Geographic         
Non-New Orleans Metro 30.6% 137 69.4% 311 
New Orleans Metro 77.9% 460 22.1% 130 
Race         
White 60.5% 425 39.5% 277 
Non-Hispanic Black 48.1% 130 51.9% 140 
Income         
Income:Poverty <1.5 45.3% 130 54.7% 157 
Income:Poverty =  1.5-3 57.8% 163 42.2% 119 
Income:Poverty = 3-6 64.0% 194 36.0% 109 
Income:Poverty >6 66.3% 110 33.7% 56 
Education         
Less than HS Education 44.2% 68 55.8% 86 
HS or GED 56.9% 181 43.1% 137 
Some College 54.5% 139 45.5% 116 
Associates or more 67.2% 209 32.8% 102 
Demographics         
Add. Members HH = 0 58.0% 98 42.0% 71 
Add. Members HH = 1 63.9% 200 36.1% 113 
Add. Members HH = 2 60.0% 111 40.0% 74 
Add. Members HH = 3 54.8% 114 45.2% 94 
Add. Members HH = 4+ 45.4% 74 54.6% 89 
Storm-related          
Evac. preparation = yes 51.7% 339 48.3% 317 
Evac. preparation = no 68.1% 256 31.9% 120 
          
Warning time = low 64.4% 179 35.6% 99 
Warning time = med. 63.0% 218 37.0% 128 
Warning time = high 48.3% 184 51.7% 197 
          
Evac. warnings = low 56.6% 138 43.4% 106 
Evac. warnings = med. 56.1% 188 43.9% 147 
Evac. warnings = high 57.6% 213 42.4% 157 
 Building upon these initial comparisons of evacuees and those households that 
delayed evacuation or never left, binary logistic regression is utilized to examine if the 
strong effect of distant social ties shown in Table 4 remains in a multivariate context.  
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The set of models below predict the odds of not evacuating before Hurricane Katrina—
that is, non-evacuees that left during the storm, after it, or never at all.  As discussed 
above, these three categories were merged because this analysis focuses on the decision 
to stay (evacuate) before the storm struck, not the factors that differentiate the final 
outcome of those that initially stayed.  
This analysis begins with a simple model (Model 1) predicting the effect of 
social networking on evacuation behavior.  Households with low levels of both local 
and distant ties serve as the reference category, and will continue to do so for the 
remainder of this thesis.  As the most “socially isolated”, this group is expected to be 
the most likely to have not evacuated before the storm.  Moreover, with low levels of 
both types of social networks, it provides a “baseline” against which the other 
“portfolios” of social relationships can be easily compared.  In this first model, the 
estimated odds of staying were statistically significant only for households with high 
levels of both local and distant ties.  This is in line with expectations, as these 
households were the most “socially connected” in the sample.  That said, the non-
significant coefficient for households with high levels of distant ties and low levels of 
local ties does not support the hypothesis that distant ties were most critical in the 
evacuation decision.  This runs contrary to the findings of the contingency table 
analysis. 
Model 2 adds a geographic variable to account for households’ location inside 
(outside) the New Orleans metropolitan area.  As the descriptive statistics above 
anticipated, households in the non-New Orleans region are significantly more likely to 
have stayed than those in the New Orleans metropolitan area.  Moreover, the social 
network variable becomes statistically non-significant after controlling for location, 
suggesting that much of that original network effect could be explained by location. 
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As Models 3-5 show, the coefficients for the geographic and social network 
variables remain relatively consistent as socioeconomic, demographic, and storm-
related variables are gradually added.  Model 3 adds race, income, and education, as 
measures of socioeconomic status.4  It is important to note that these variables were 
subjected to collinearity diagnostic tests.  Tolerance levels were near 1.0 for each, and 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) was below 10.0—in fact, none was over 2.0.  These 
results allow us to conclude that multicollinearity was not a problem, and all three 
variables can be included in the model.  Moreover, race-income, race-education, and 
income-education interaction terms were included in various other iterations of this 
model, but were not statistically significant at the .05 level (and thus not included).  
Model 4 controls for household size, while Model 5 adds the three storm-related 
variables of interest—evacuation preparation, warning time, and number of evacuation 
warnings.   
In the final model (Model 5), we see that race and education are the strongest 
socioeconomic predictors of evacuation behavior.  Blacks and households represented 
by low-educated respondents were 1.6 and 2.1 times more likely, respectively, to have 
not evacuated before the storm than their white and highest-educated counterparts.  
Despite the suggestion of the crosstabulations above, family size had no significant 
effect.  However, evacuation preparation and the number of evacuation warnings that 
households received are statistically significant predictors of evacuation. As expected, 
households that received few warnings were less likely to have evacuated than those 
that received a high number of warnings.  However, contrary to original expectations 
and the survey’s “evacuation preparation” label, households that did not pack three days 
                                                
4 Some readers may be interested to know that in a model including only social 
networks, location, and race as independent variables, only race and location were 
statistically significant.  Race (black) had a coefficient of 1.719, with a p-value of 
0.001; Location (New Orleans metro) had a coefficient of 8.054, with a p-value of .000.   
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of food and water in advance of the storm were more likely to have evacuated than 
those that took this measure.  
It is also important to note the overall model statistics included at the bottom of 
Table 4.  Each of the overall models is statistically significant at the 0.05 or .001 level.  
The -2 Log Likelihood Ratio does not provide much information in itself; however, the 
decrease in the magnitude of this ratio suggests that the latter models were strongest.  
The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test—similar to a chi-square test—provides 
insight into the fit of the observed values relative to expected values.  P-values greater 
than 0.05 fail to overturn the null hypothesis that there is no difference between 
observed and expected values.  Hence, all of the models displayed in Table 5 “pass” the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test.  Lastly, two pseudo R-squared measures are included in Table 
5.  The dichotomous dependent variable makes the interpretation of these statistics less 
straightforward (and more disputed among statisticians) than a traditional R-square 
measure.  Nonetheless, the increase in both pseudo R-squared statistics across the five 
models demonstrates that the explanatory power grows in each subsequent model.  In 
short then, these measures of overall fit and explanatory power provide support for the 
models—and suggest that the final model is the strongest of the five. 
 Returning to the substantive interpretation of these analyses, this group of 
models indicates that the odds of evacuation differed significantly between the New 
Orleans metropolitan area and other counties and parishes.  This suggests that separate 
analyses of both sub-samples are needed.  This is particularly important due to the 
geographical expanse of the non-New Orleans sample.  The diversity of pre-storm 
social conditions, as well as the storm impact and political responses in this region, 
make it difficult to make the same claims as may be possible with the separate New 
Orleans sample 
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Table 5: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis, Full Sample 
Predicting the odds of not evacuating before Hurricane Katrina; Full Sample (n=848) 
(Significance levels in parentheses) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Network variables             
Low Local, Low 
Distanta             
High Local, High 
Distant 
.704 
(.020)** .819 (.244) .724 (.042)* .916 (.642) .925 (.681) 
.927 
(.706) 
Low Local, High 
Distant .703 (.146) .688 (.173) .731 (.215) .747 (.317) .750 (.323) 
.639 
(.154) 
High Local, Low 
Distant 1.038 (.833) 1.141 (.518) 1.103 1.298 (.226) 1.314 (.207) 
1.329 
(.213) 
Geographic Variables             
Non-New Orleans 
Metro   
8.135 
(.000)***   
7.893 
(.000)*** 
7.891 
(.000)*** 
7.644 
(.000)*** 
New Orleans Metroa             
Socio-economic 
variables             
Whitea             
Non-Hispanic Black     
1.632 
(.001)*** 1.568 (.012)** 1.544 (.019)** 
1.618 
(.016)** 
              
Income : Poverty <1.5       .984 (.955) .925 (.790) 
.756 
(.377) 
Income : Poverty = 
1.5-3       .858 (.560) .822 (.460) 
.726 
(.258) 
Income : Poverty = 3-6       .919 (.734) .901 (.675) 
.833 
(.487) 
Income : Poverty >6a             
              Less than HS 
Education       1.797 (.030)** 1.825 (.026)** 
2.172 
(.009)** 
HS or GED       1.495 (.057)* 1.509 (.052)* 
1.398 
(.140) 
Some College       1.497 (.061)* 1.505 (.058)* 
1.433 
(.112) 
Associates or morea             
Demographic 
variables             
Add. Members of HH 
= 0         1.126 (.665) 
.979 
(.944) 
Add. Members of HH 
= 1         .778 (.312) 
.760 
(.300) 
Add. Members of HH 
= 2         .863 (.585) 
.858 
(.591) 
Add. Members of HH 
= 3         .928 (.770) 
.913 
(740) 
Add. Members of HH 
= 4+a             
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Table 5 Continued 
Storm-related 
variables             
Evacuation preparation 
= yesa             
Evacuaton preparation 
= no           
.554 
(.001)** 
 
 
            
Warning time = low           
.764 
(.202) 
Warning time = 
medium           
.786 
(.221) 
Warning time = higha             
              Evacuation warnings = 
low           
1.736 
(.014)** 
Evacuation warnings = 
medium           
1.138 
(.503) 
Evacuation warnings = 
higha     
  
        
Overall model 
significance 0.048** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 
(-) 2 Log Likelihood 1363.145 1129.274 1265.599 1043.613 1040.854 918.797 
Hosmer-Lemeshow  1 0.768 0.077 0.776 0.712 0.969 
Cox-Snell R-Squared 0.008 0.214 0.021 0.227 0.229 0.245 
Nagelkerke R-
Squared 0.011 0.287 0.028 0.304 0.307 0.329 
aReference category *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001 
 
Evacuation Before the Storm vs. During, After, or Never: New Orleans Sample 
 To further explore the significant effect of geographic location in the combined 
sample, this section focuses exclusively on the New Orleans metropolitan area sample.  
This sub-sample will be subject to the same descriptive and regression analyses as the 
full sample. 
 The descriptive contingency table below once again displays the marginal 
percentages and totals of the independent variables according to their evacuation status.  
The differences that emerge along social network lines are less than in the full sample, 
although households with high levels of distant ties continued to have higher 
proportions (approximately 25%) of non-evacuees than households with few distant ties 
(approximately 18%).  This is consistent with expectations, but the association is weak 
in this bivariate context. 
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A geographic variable was also included in the analysis of the New Orleans 
sample.  In this case, it accounts for the dichotomy between New Orleans City and the 
remainder of the New Orleans metropolitan area.  The differences between these two 
locations are minimal, as nearly three-quarters of the respondents in both areas 
evacuated before the storm.   
 The racial breakdown of evacuation behavior is consistent with expectations, 
although perhaps not as stark as expected: while 20.1% of whites did not evacuate 
before the storm, 29.2% of blacks stayed.  The descriptions of the two other indicators 
of socioeconomic status are also in line with above hypotheses: a greater proportion of 
low-income and low-education households were non-evacuees than their higher-status 
counterparts.  More specifically, 33.6% of the lowest-income households did not 
evacuate before the storm, which compares to only 16.4% of those in the highest 
income category.  The educational trend is similar, with 33.8% and 15.0% of those in 
the lowest and highest categories, respectively, not evacuating before the storm. 
 Among households in the New Orleans sample, the breakdown of evacuees and 
non-evacuees by household size yielded slight and inconsistent differences.  However, 
notable trends did emerge when comparing evacuation status groups according to the 
storm-related variables.  As in the combined sample, households that took preparation 
measures were less likely to have evacuated before the storm (73.2%) than those who 
did not (85.0%).  Households that received a low number of evacuation warnings were 
slightly more likely to have stayed (26.5%) than those who received medium and high 
numbers of warnings (both 20.6%).  Finally, it is interesting to note that households that 
received high levels of warning time were less likely than others to have evacuated 
before the storm.  This is contrary to conventional wisdom and expectations, but 
remains to be tested in multivariate analysis. 
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Table 6: Contingency Table, New Orleans Sample 
Independent Variables by Evacuation Status: New Orleans Sample 
Social Networks 
Evacuated 
Before       
N 
Evacuated 
Before      
% 
Evacuated 
Eventually/Never        
N 
Evacuated 
Eventually/Never        
% 
Low Local, Low Distant 74.3% 153 25.7% 53 
High Local, High Distant 82.6% 176 17.4% 37 
Low Local, High Distant 81.6% 40 18.4% 9 
High Local, Low Distant 74.5% 76 25.5% 26 
Geographic         
New Orleans City 73.7% 123 26.3% 44 
New Orleans Metro 79.7% 337 20.3% 86 
Race         
White 79.9% 325 20.1% 82 
Non-Hispanic Black 70.8% 102 29.2% 42 
Income         
Income:Poverty <1.5 66.4% 79 33.6% 40 
Income:Poverty =  1.5-3 79.1% 125 20.9% 33 
Income:Poverty = 3-6 80.7% 159 19.3% 38 
Income:Poverty >6 83.6% 97 16.4% 19 
Education         
Less than HS Education 66.2% 45 33.8% 23 
HS or GED 74.7% 136 25.3% 46 
Some College 77.9% 109 22.1% 31 
Associates or more 85.0% 170 15.0% 30 
Demographics         
Add. Members HH = 0 72.0% 77 28.0% 30 
Add. Members HH = 1 81.9% 167 18.1% 37 
Add. Members HH = 2 79.8% 91 20.2% 23 
Add. Members HH = 3 75.7% 81 24.3% 26 
Add. Members HH = 4+ 75.9% 44 24.1% 14 
Storm-related          
Evac. preparation = yes 73.2% 249 26.8% 91 
Evac. preparation = no 85.0% 209 15.0% 37 
          
Warning time = low 78.2% 147 21.8% 41 
Warning time = med. 81.8% 175 18.2% 39 
Warning time = high 74.6% 126 25.4% 43 
          
Evac. warnings = low 73.5% 114 26.5% 41 
Evac. warnings = med. 79.4% 143 20.6% 37 
Evac. warnings = high 79.4% 154 20.6% 40 
 
Employing the same model building logic as in the analysis of the pooled sample, the 
analysis of non-evacuation from the New Orleans metropolitan area began with a 
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simple prediction of the odds of non-evacuation using household social networks as the 
only independent variable.  In contrast to the pooled model, households with high levels 
of both local and distant ties are found to have been significantly less likely to have not 
evacuated before the storm than their socially isolated counterparts.  This effect remains 
significant, even after controlling for geographic location (New Orleans City/remaining 
metropolitan area) in Model 2.  This suggests that it is not merely the level of local or 
distant ties that matters most in the evacuation process, but rather overall “social 
embeddedness.”  In other words, households that had high levels of social ties at both 
local and distant levels were uniquely (and advantageously) positioned vis-à-vis 
‘mainstream’ society in a way that allowed them to access the resources needed to 
evacuate better than those with other types of social ties. 
This network effect diminishes, however, after controlling for the additional sets 
of variables that are added in Models 3-5.  It should be noted that collinearity 
diagnostics again confirmed the absence of multicollinearity between these 
socioeconomic indicators.  Likewise, interaction terms were not significant in other 
interactions of this model not shown here.  Among the three socioeconomic indicators5 
that were included, education emerges as the only significant predictor of the odds of 
evacuation behavior.  It is particularly notable that the effect of education was 
significant when controlling for income.  This suggests that education is more than a 
means to acquire economic resources; it provides social skills (e.g. navigating “the 
system” that were important in this disaster context.  In the final model, those 
households represented by respondents with less than a high school education were 
approximately 3.0 times more likely to have stayed than their highest-educated 
                                                
5 In a model whose independent variables include only social networks, location, and 
race, only social networks are statistically significant.  Those households with high 
levels of both local and distant social networks had a coefficient of 0.603, with a p-
value of .048.  All other categories of this variable had non-significant coefficients. 
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neighbors.  Those represented by holders of a high school diploma were slightly less 
than two times more likely to have not evacuated before the storm than the reference 
group.6 
 Among the demographic and storm-related variables, only storm preparation and 
the number of evacuation warnings had significant effects on the odds of not evacuating 
before the storm.  Households that did not prepare by packing three days of food and 
water were less than half as likely to have stayed through at least part of the storm than 
those that did prepare.  Similar to the pooled analysis, the effect of evacuation warnings 
was consistent with expectations, with those receiving a low number of warnings nearly 
twice as likely to have failed to evacuate before Katrina. 
 Lastly, the measures of overall fit and explanatory power provide support for the 
latter models.  Each of the latter three models is significant at the .05 level, and “passes” 
the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test at the .001 level.  The -2 Log Likelihood 
Ratio and pseudo R-squared measures all indicate that explanatory power increases with 
each subsequent model, and that Model 5 is the strongest of those included in Table 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 This statistic is significant only at the .10 level. 
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Table 7: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis, New Orleans Sample 
Predicting the odds of not evacuating before Hurricane Katrina; New Orleans Sample (n=395) 
(Significance levels in parentheses) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Network variables           
Low Local, Low Distanta           
High Local, High Distant 
.607 
(.038)** 
.589 
(.029)** .723 (.225) .732 (.249) .715 (.245) 
Low Local, High Distant .650 (.283) .658 (.299) .851 (.701) .827 (.655) .649 (.388) 
High Local, Low Distant .988 (.964) .999 (.996) 1.152 (.628) 1.209 (.526) 1.101 (.764) 
Geographic Variables           
New Orleans City   1.407 (.121) 1.425 (.176) 1.416 (.191) 1.441 (.210) 
New Orleans Metroa           
Socio-economic variables           
Whitea           
Non-Hispanic Black     1.087 (.762) 1.045 (.877) 1.051 (.870) 
            Income : Poverty <1.5     1.888 (.116) 1.725 (.185) 1.396 (.456) 
Income : Poverty = 1.5-3     1.225 (.589) 1.165 (.687) 1.030 (.942) 
Income : Poverty = 3-6     1.318 (.428) 1.348 (.396) 1.227 (.578) 
Income : Poverty >6a           
            
Less than HS Education     
2.160 
(.051)* 
2.270 
(.040)** 
3.037 
(.011)** 
HS or GED     
1.709 
(.080)* 1.703 (.084)* 1.785 (.086)* 
Some College     1.425 (.272) 1.460 (.245) 1.480 (.267) 
Associates or morea           
Demographic variables           
Add. Members of HH = 0       1.301 (.516) 1.083 (.859) 
Add. Members of HH = 1       .690 (.351) .642 (.298) 
Add. Members of HH = 2       .773 (.537) .609 (.272) 
Add. Members of HH = 3       1.174 (.694) 1.052 (.908) 
Add. Members of HH = 4+a           
Storm-related variables           
Evacuation preparation = yesa           
Evacuaton preparation = no         .451 (.002)** 
            Warning time = low         1.018 (.953) 
Warning time = medium         .992 (.978) 
Warning time = higha           
            
Evacuation warnings = low         
1.829 
(.049)** 
Evacuation warnings = medium         .941 (.835) 
Evacuation warnings = higha           
Overall model significance 0.138 0.096* 0.018** 0.018** 0.003** 
(-) 2 Log Likelihood 594.152 591.786 542.654 536.985 460.100 
Hosmer-Lemeshow  1.000 0.723 0.774 0.267 0.539 
Cox-Snell R-Squared 0.010 0.014 0.042 0.052 0.085 
Nagelkerke R-Squared 0.015 0.021 0.064 0.080 0.129 
aReference category *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001 
 
Evacuation Before the Storm vs. During, After, or Never: Non-New Orleans Sample 
Turning to the sub-sample of counties and parishes outside of the New Orleans 
metropolitan area, descriptive cross-tabulations once again serve as the point of 
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departure.  The main trend to emerge with respect to social networks is that households 
with high levels of distant ties and low levels of proximate ties were the most likely to 
have evacuated before the storm.  In contrast, households with a high density of local 
ties were slightly more likely to have failed to evacuate before the storm, regardless of 
their level of distant ties.  It was thus the level of local social ties that distinguished the 
population that evacuated before the storm from that which evacuated during or after. 
This runs contrary to the New Orleans sample, in which evacuation status was 
associated with the level of households’ distant ties, regardless of the level of their local 
network connections.   
Examining evacuation status according to race, we see that a higher percentage 
of blacks (77.8%) did not evacuate before the storm when compared with whites 
(66.1%).  The association of income and education with evacuation behavior is much 
less clear.  The differences among income categories are slight and contrary to 
expectations: the highest-income category has the highest percentage of non-evacuees 
(74.0%).  With respect to education, the distributions of evacuees and non-evacuees are 
inconsistent, with households headed by respondents with less than a high school 
education (73.3%) or some college (73.9%) having a higher percentage of non-evacuees 
than those headed by holders of high school  (91%) or college diplomas (85%).   The 
breakdown of household size and evacuation status is similarly ambiguous, with no 
clear pattern emerging from these marginal proportions. 
Finally, analysis of the storm-related variables reveals that, contrary to the 
findings for the New Orleans sample, a greater percentage (36.2%) of the households 
that packed three days of food and water evacuated before the storm than those that did 
not prepare (28.5%).  The association between evacuation behavior and warning time 
was again contrary to expectation: a greater proportion of households that received high 
levels of warning time did not evacuate before the storm (72.6%) when compared to 
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those receiving low or moderate warning time.  Lastly, a breakdown of households by 
the number of evacuation warnings they received yields only slight differences.  These 
are nonetheless consistent with expectations, with households receiving a low (73.0%) 
and moderate (71%) number of evacuation warnings more likely to have not evacuated 
before the storm than those that received a high number of warnings (66.5%) 
Table 8: Contingency Table, Non-New Orleans Sample 
Independent Variables by Evacuation Status: Non-New Orleans Sample 
Social Networks 
Evacuated 
Before       
N 
Evacuated 
Before      
% 
Evacuated 
Eventually/Never        
N 
Evacuated 
Eventually/Never        
% 
Low Local, Low Distant 31.6% 59 68.4% 128 
High Local, High Distant 28.9% 37 71.1% 91 
Low Local, High Distant 38.5% 15 61.5% 24 
High Local, Low Distant 25.9% 21 74.1% 60 
Race         
White 33.9% 100 66.1% 195 
Non-Hispanic Black 22.2% 28 77.8% 98 
Income         
Income:Poverty <1.5 30.4% 51 69.6% 117 
Income:Poverty = 1.5-3 30.6% 38 69.4% 86 
Income:Poverty = 3-6 33.0% 35 67.0% 71 
Income:Poverty >6 26.0% 13 74.0% 37 
Education         
Less than HS Education 26.7% 23 73.3% 63 
HS or GED 33.1% 45 66.9% 91 
Some College 26.1% 30 73.9% 85 
Associates or more 35.1% 39 64.9% 72 
Demographics         
Add. Members HH = 0 33.9% 21 66.1% 41 
Add. Members HH = 1 30.3% 33 69.7% 76 
Add. Members HH = 2 28.2% 20 71.8% 51 
Add. Members HH = 3 32.7% 33 67.3% 68 
Add. Members HH = 4+ 28.6% 30 71.4% 75 
Storm-related          
Evac. preparation = yes 36.2% 47 63.8% 83 
Evac. preparation = no 28.5% 90 71.5% 226 
          
Warning time = low 35.6% 32 64.4% 58 
Warning time = med. 32.6% 43 67.4% 89 
Warning time = high 27.4% 58 72.6% 154 
          
Evac. warnings = low 27.0% 24 73.0% 65 
Evac. warnings = med. 29.0% 45 71.0% 110 
Evac. warnings = high 33.5% 59 66.5% 117 
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The data in Table 8 below describes a series of logistic regression models of this data, 
which were developed in accordance to the same strategy used above.  Once again, the 
first model simply predicts the odds of non-evacuation with respect to only the social 
network variable—providing a base from which additional models were developed.  
The effect of this factor is not significant in this, or any of the subsequent models.   
In fact, as socioeconomic7, demographic, and storm-related variables are added 
in Models 2-4, only race and income emerge as significant predictors—and the latter 
only at the .10 level.8  More specifically, blacks were slightly more than twice as likely 
to have failed to evacuate before the storm than whites.  Contrary to expectations, 
however, the poorest households were more than twice as likely to have evacuated 
before the storm than their high-income counterparts.  This may reflect a 
disproportionate degree of environmental risk (e.g. flooding) among low-income 
households—but data limitations prevent any such conclusion to be made. 
In addition to these limitations, the measures of overall model fit and 
explanatory power suggest that the variables included in this analysis are poor 
predictors of evacuation behavior in the non-New Orleans sample.  Although the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test suggests that the fit of the models is acceptable, none of the 
models are significant at the .10 level.  The pseudo R-squared measures are also less 
than the pooled and New Orleans metropolitan area samples. 
 These counterintuitive findings, and the generally poor explanatory power of 
these models, likely reflect the heterogeneity of social and environmental conditions in 
this large, non-New Orleans sample.  For example, it is possible that wealthy 
households were situated in less environmentally vulnerable locations—a suggestion 
                                                
7 A model in which social networks and race are the only independent variables, only 
race has a statistically significant effect (coefficient=1.920; p=0.011). 
8 Collinearity diagnostics confirmed, once again, the absence of multicollinearity.  
Interaction terms for the socioeconomic variables were also non-significant (p<0.05). 
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consistent with the previous research of political geographers reviewed above.  This is 
only speculation, however, as it is difficult to analyze evacuation behavior among a 
sample of respondents who were faced such varying degrees of imperative to evacuate.  
As discussed in the data and measures section, this variance could have been accounted 
for with geocoded data; but interpretations are extremely limited without it.  
 
Table 9: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis, Non-New Orleans Sample 
Predicting the odds of evacuating before Hurricane Katrina; Non-New Orleans Sample (n=375) 
(Significance Level in Parentheses) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Network variables         
Low Local, Low Distanta         
High Local, High Distant 1.134 (.617) 1.058 (.839) 1.067 (.820) 1.098 (.756) 
Low Local, High Distant .738 (.404) .645 (.261) .648 (.268) .644 (.279) 
High Local, Low Distant 1.317 (.356) 1.418 (.279) 1.422 (.276) 1.516 (.222) 
Socio-economic variables         
Whitea         
Non-Hispanic Black   2.054 (.011)** 2.028 (.013)** 2.159 (.013)** 
          Income : Poverty <1.5   .465 (.096)* .433 (.079)* .367 (.055)* 
Income : Poverty = 1.5-3   .543 (.168) .523 (.152) .437 (.092)* 
Income : Poverty = 3-6   .593 (.225) .561 (.188) .502 (.147) 
Income : Poverty >6a         
          Less than HS Education   1.538 (.243) 1.531 (.251) 1.814 (.150) 
HS or GED   1.363 (.312) 1.350 (.330) 1.155 (.658) 
Some College   1.610 (.129) 1.625 (.124) 1.527 (.195) 
Associates or morea         
Demographic variables         
Add. Members of HH = 0     .794 (.551) .765 (.509) 
Add. Members of HH = 1     .805 (.522) .809 (.552) 
Add. Members of HH = 2     .989 (.976) 1.102 (.814) 
Add. Members of HH = 3     .677 (.236) .680 (.272) 
Add. Members of HH = 4+a         
Storm-related variables         
Evacuation preparation = yesa         
Evacuaton preparation = no       .667 (.122) 
          Warning time = low       .639 (.148) 
Warning time = medium       .762 (.329) 
Warning time = higha         
          Evacuation warnings = low       1.509 (.224) 
Evacuation warnings = medium       1.248 (.418) 
Evacuation warnings = higha         
Overall model significance 0.534 0.163 0.311 0.170 
(-) 2 Log Likelihood 531.780 487.650 485.828 437.586 
Hosmer-Lemeshow  1.000 0.672 0.320 0.659 
Cox-Snell R-Squared 0.005 0.034 0.038 0.064 
Nagelkerke R-Squared 0.007 0.048 0.054 0.090 
aReference category *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001 
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Conclusions: Findings, Expectations, and Previous Research 
 The analyses above have demonstrated significant differences between the 
factors affecting evacuation behavior during Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans 
metropolitan area and the remainder of the counties and parishes eligible for FEMA 
individual assistance.  Although the geographic diversity of the non-New Orleans 
sample—and thus also the combined sample—limits the comparisons that can be drawn 
from these findings, an overall comparison between the final models, as well as with 
previous research, is nonetheless instructive. 
 The table below lists the estimated effect of each independent variable on the 
odds of delaying evacuation or never evacuating relative to evacuating before the storm.  
The symbols represent the “direction” of the effect on the odds of staying, with a 
positive or negative sign indicating that the variable was significant within the minimal 
.10 threshold in a final multivariate model.  Attention will be afforded primarily to the 
two sub-samples: comparisons between these groups and the full sample are 
problematic because the latter are endogenous to the former. 
 Examining the role of social networks first, we see that expectations failed to be 
met in any case.  The only significant network effects were observed in the simplest 
models of the combined and New Orleans samples (before controlling for other factors). 
While this should certainly not discourage further research on the role of social 
networks in disaster situations, these findings simply do not lend support to the 
argument that the strength of a household’s ties plays a significant role in evacuation 
decisions during Hurricane Katrina.  While this “non-finding” may be partly explained 
by poor measurement, it is also possible that the social embeddedness represented by 
networks does not play a significant role in the relatively short evacuation decision-
making process.  Instead, more basic resources—such as money and access to basic 
information—play a more central role.  Although this is contrary to the expectations of 
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this thesis, it is worth noting that this is consistent with scholars of migration who argue 
that networks explain only the maintenance of long-term migration systems (not the 
short-term emergence of migration). 
 The effects of the two basic geographic variables that were included in these 
analyses were consistent with expectations.  Net of social networks, socio-demographic 
characteristics, and evacuation preparation, affected households living outside of the 
New Orleans metropolitan area were significantly more likely to stay than those living 
in the New Orleans metropolitan area.  Moreover, there was no significant difference in 
the odds of delaying evacuation or never evacuating (compared with evacuating before 
the storm) between the city of New Orleans and the remaining parts of the metropolitan 
area.  Both findings support the conclusion that the degree to which evacuation was 
necessary was significantly more heterogeneous across non-New Orleans sample frame 
than in the New Orleans metropolitan area. 
 The effect of race was consistent with expectations in the non-New Orleans 
sample, with blacks more likely to have delayed evacuation or never evacuated than 
whites.  However, in sharp contrast to expectations and popular reports, there were no 
significant racial differences when predicting the odds of evacuating eventually or never 
in the New Orleans metropolitan area.   
 Education was the only socioeconomic factor with a significant effect in the 
New Orleans sample.  As expected, households represented by respondents with low 
educational attainment were more likely to have not evacuated before the storm than 
their highly educated counterparts.  This was not the case in the non-New Orleans 
sample, where the effect of education was not significant.  However, households in this 
sample with an income-to-poverty line ratio of 3 or less were more likely to have 
delayed evacuation or not evacuated at all (when compared to leaving before the storm) 
than those in the highest income category. 
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 In contrast to expectations, household size did not have a significant effect at 
any order or in any sample.  However, two of the three storm-related variables did 
emerge as significant factors in the New Orleans sample.  First, households that packed 
three days of food and water were more likely to have stayed through at least the 
beginning of the storm than those that did not take this measure.  Although this behavior 
is potentially important for evacuees and non-evacuees alike, the findings of this thesis 
suggest that this action was largely taken as a means of preparing to endure the storm 
rather than evacuate.  This suggests that policymakers should emphasize that such basic 
preparation steps are not adequate to “ride out the storm”, and that evacuation is the best 
option.  Conversely, they should state that evacuation is a necessary but insufficient 
step: evacuees must prepare for their time away from home to avoid a situation in which 
they lack the basic necessities.   
Second, analyses of the New Orleans metropolitan area found that, as expected, 
households that received a low number of evacuation warnings were more likely to 
have delayed evacuation or never left at all than those that received a high number of 
warnings.  Considered in relation to the lack of statistical significance of warning 
time—the amount of time before the storm that households heard it might strike—this 
suggests that official evacuation warnings do indeed influence behavior more than 
informal social relations.  
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Table 10: Observed Effect of Independent Variables 
Effect on Odds of Evacuating Eventually or Never Evacuating vs. Evacuating Before 
  Expected Full Sample NO Sample 
Non-NO 
Sample 
Network variables         
Low Local, Low Distanta         
High Local, High Distant - N.S. N.S. N.S. 
Low Local, High Distant - N.S. N.S. N.S. 
High Local, Low Distant + N.S. N.S. N.S. 
Geographic Variables         
Non-New Orleans Metro + + N/A N/A 
New Orleans Metroa         
          
New Orleans City N.S. N/A N.S. N/A 
New Orleans Metroa         
Socio-economic variables         
Whitea         
Non-Hispanic Black + + N.S. + 
Income : Poverty <=1.5 + N.S. N.S. + 
Income : Poverty = 1.5-3 + N.S. N.S. + 
Income : Poverty = 3-6 + N.S. N.S. N.S. 
Income : Poverty >6a         
Less than HS Education + + + N.S. 
HS or GED + N.S. + N.S. 
Some College + N.S. N.S. N.S. 
Associates or morea         
Demographic variables         
Add. Members of HH = 0 - N.S. N.S. N.S. 
Add. Members of HH = 1 - N.S. N.S. N.S. 
Add. Members of HH = 2 - N.S. N.S. N.S. 
Add. Members of HH = 3 - N.S. N.S. N.S. 
Add. Members of HH = 4+a         
Storm-related variables         
Evacuation preparation = yesa         
Evacuation preparation = no + - - N.S. 
Warning time = low + N.S N.S. N.S. 
Warning time = med + N.S. N.S. N.S. 
Warning time = higha         
Evacuation warnings = low + + + N.S. 
Evacuation warnings = med + N.S. N.S. N.S. 
Evacuation warnings = higha         
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In addition to comparing the various analyses in this thesis, it is important to 
consider these results in relation to previous research on evacuation behavior during 
Hurricane Katrina.  As mentioned in the literature review above, Elliot and Pais (2006) 
and Haney et al. (2007) conducted the only two systematic studies of evacuation timing 
and patterns to date.  Despite the slightly divergent foci of their research, these studies 
nonetheless provide important points for comparison and triangulation (particularly 
since they draw upon a different source of data than this thesis). 
Elliot and Pais examined a Gallup Poll sample of Gulf Coast residents who had 
sought help from the Red Cross during or after the storm.  Separating New Orleans City 
residents from others, they compared the odds of (a) evacuating during or after the 
storm relative to doing so before it and (b) never evacuating relative to doing so before 
the storm.  Controlling for the respondents’ sex, age, and homeowner and parental 
statuses, the objective of this component of their study was to understand the effects of 
race and class on “evacuation timing”.   
Among New Orleans City residents, Elliot and Pais found a strong negative 
relationship between income and the odds of evacuating before the storm (both 
comparisons).  As they report,  
 
New Orleanians with household incomes in the $40,000-50,000 range 
were nearly twice as likely as those in the $10,000-20,000 range to 
evacuate before, as opposed to after the storm.  This class difference 
climbs to nearly threefold when predicting odds of not evacuating the 
city at all (Elliot and Pais 308). 
 
This is consistent with the findings this thesis, which show a significant negative 
relationship between socioeconomic status and the odds that residents of the entire New 
Orleans metropolitan area evacuated eventually or never evacuated relative to doing so 
before the storm.  However, this thesis found that education is a stronger 
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socioeconomic predictor of evacuation behavior than income.  It also shows that storm 
related variables—preparation behavior and the number of evacuation warnings 
received by a household—had an important effect on the odds of non-evacuation. 
Very strong and significant racial differences within the city also emerged in 
Elliot and Pais’s study, but only when comparing those respondents that evacuated 
before relative to those that never evacuated.  This is consistent with this thesis, which 
found a non-significant effect of race on the odds of delaying evacuation or never 
evacuating from the New Orleans metropolitan sample.  As discussed earlier, this thesis 
did not examine the population that never evacuated separately from households that 
delayed evacuation. 
 Income differences were non-significant outside of the city of New Orleans in 
Elliot and Pais’s study.  The findings of this thesis suggest otherwise, as households in 
the lowest income category were significantly less likely than their high-income 
counterparts to have evacuated eventually or never evacuated than to have done so 
before the storm.  However, this difference may be more methodological than 
substantive, as Elliot and Pais include the non-city New Orleans metropolitan area in 
their “other” sample.   
With respect to race in the region outside of New Orleans, Elliot and Pais report 
that, net of all other factors, blacks were approximately 1.5 times more likely than 
whites to evacuate after the storm, rather than before it (Elliot and Pais 308).  Likewise, 
this thesis finds that blacks were more than twice as likely to have delayed evacuation 
or never evacuated than to have done so before the storm.   
 The analysis of Haney et al. (2007) uses the same Gallup data as above, but 
considers both the timing and strategy of household evacuation.  The former 
distinguishes between those who left before the storm and those who left during or after 
it, or never at all; the latter dichotomy refers to whether the household left (stayed) in 
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unison, or separated in some way.  With respect to the latter category, if the individual 
observed in the sample evacuated—but without his or her entire household—they are 
considered to have “evacuated in division”; if they stayed—but with some household 
members evacuating—they were considered to have “stayed in division.”  Although 
slight complications are introduced by their distinctions between evacuation strategies, 
a number of important points can be gleaned from this comparison. 
Predicting the odds of “staying in unison” to “evacuating in unison”, Haney et 
al. find that the odds of staying were 4.44 less for New Orleans residents; 1.65 higher 
for childless males; 1.57 higher for blacks; and decreased by 0.22 for every increase in 
a logged and centered category of income.  Using the same reference category, odds of 
“staying by division” were 2.18 higher for childless men; 1.97 higher for fathers; 1.62 
higher for those with religious faith; 1.56 higher for those employed before the 
hurricane; 1.52 higher for blacks; and decreased by 0.58 for every increase in a logged 
and centered categorization of income.  Lastly, comparing those who “evacuated by 
division” to those who “evacuated in unison”, the odds of the latter increased by 1.40 
for blacks; and increased by 1.28 for those employed before the hurricane. 
 Despite a number of incomparable variables, a number of important points 
emerge.  First, both Haney et al. and this thesis observe that non-New Orleans residents 
were much less likely to have stayed than leave before Katrina struck.  Haney et al. also 
found that the odds of both forms of staying were significantly higher for blacks than 
whites.  This is consistent with the analysis of the full model in this thesis, which finds 
that blacks were slightly more than 1.5 times as likely to have evacuated eventually or 
never at all then leave before the storm.  Likewise, Haney et al. find a negative 
relationship between income and the odds of staying in some form (when controlling 
for location).  Although the inclusion of a measure of educational attainment in this 
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thesis leads to slightly different conclusions, the studies agree on the general, negative 
relationship between socioeconomic status and the odds of staying.   
 Broadly then, we see that the findings of this thesis are consistent with previous 
research on evacuation behavior during Katrina.  The only significant difference 
observed was with respect to the effect of income in the non-New Orleans region.  As a 
result of previously mentioned methodological differences, it is not possible to make 
definitive statements on this disparity.   
 Despite these agreements, it is important to emphasize that this thesis went 
beyond these previous studies to find a relationship between storm preparation 
behaviors, the receipt of evacuation warnings, and evacuation outcomes.  In this way, 
the study accounted for the degree to which households were “engaged” in critical pre-
storm developments.  Although the social network variable was non-significant in each 
of the analyses, these findings do lend some support to the notion that the evacuation 
behavior cannot be explained in only structural terms, and that households’ position 
vis-à-vis social process (e.g. the flow of information) is important in disaster contexts. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This thesis has examined household evacuation behavior in New Orleans and 
other significantly affected counties and parishes throughout the Gulf Coast during 
Hurricane Katrina.  Drawing upon insights from the sociological literature on migration, 
it sought to provide a unique perspective on human mobility during the storm by 
focusing on the role of social networks.  This thesis was guided by the expectation that 
households with low levels of distant social ties would be more likely to have not 
evacuated before the storm than those with a high level of distant network connections. 
 Contrary to expectations, however, the analyses here provide no evidence that 
networks affected the odds of evacuation during Hurricane Katrina.  Instead, the 
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findings of this thesis largely confirmed those of previous research, which suggest that 
race and socioeconomic status were the main factors explaining evacuation behavior 
during Hurricane Katrina.  More specifically, educational attainment was a significant 
predictor of evacuation behavior in the New Orleans metropolitan area; race and income 
were significant factors in the non-New Orleans sample.  
In addition to, and going beyond previous research, this thesis found that a 
number of storm-related variables neglected in previous studies (Elliot and Pais 2006, 
Haney et al. 2007) had important associations with evacuation behavior.   Storm 
preparation behavior and the number of evacuation warnings received by households 
both had significant effects on the odds of evacuating before the storm in the New 
Orleans metropolitan sample.  In contrast to some previous research (e.g. Dow and 
Cutter 1998) the latter finding suggests that official evacuation-related information does 
indeed play an important role in households’ evacuation decisions.  The former result 
has less clear implications.  The positive relationship between storm preparation and the 
odds of non-evacuation suggests that most of the households that packed three days of 
food and water viewed this as a means of preparing to ride out the storm, not evacuate.  
Future research should seek to understand why households that were engaged in storm-
related developments enough to prepare did not heed warnings to evacuate.  
Conversely, research should also consider why households that followed evacuation 
orders did not take the steps needed to live as evacuees for at least three days.  
A number of other issues emerge from these analyses, and have implications for 
the interpretation of these findings and future research.  First, the differences between 
the New Orleans and non-New Orleans samples require further study.  As mentioned 
above, a truly comparative study will require more detailed information about the non-
New Orleans sample.  This includes data on the geographic distribution of the 
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respondents across the region (e.g. urban vs. rural), as well as the status of evacuation 
orders and the degree of storm impact in their counties and parishes of origin. 
 Second, further research should examine the factors that differentiated the 
households that (a) evacuated during the storm; (b) evacuated after the storm; or (c) 
never evacuated.  Analyses not included in this thesis found that the set of variables 
used to predict the odds of evacuation before the storm do not adequately explain these 
differences in evacuation behavior after the storm struck.  Hence, future research should 
consider other important variables that may have emerged during the storm—such as 
storm surge, flood depth, and forced evacuation (or rescue)—which may have pushed 
significant numbers of households to evacuate.  In short, it is likely that unique sets of 
variables explain the decision-making processes before and during/after a storm hits. 
 This is only one example of a general need to strengthen or include a number of 
additional measures in future research on Katrina, and environment-related human 
mobility more broadly.  Foremost, the measure of social networks used in this study 
could be greatly strengthened by collecting data on more storm-specific aspects of 
households’ social ties.  The questions asked in the survey used for this study were 
overly broad, and do not necessarily capture the number of ties that a household would 
rely upon in a time of emergency.  Questions in future surveys should be developed 
specifically to measure this latter type of tie.  Moreover, ethnographic fieldwork could 
be utilized to understand the particular ways that households’ social ties affected their 
evacuation decisions. 
The discussion in the literature review above also suggested that the context in 
which networks are located may play an important role in how they shape mobility.  
This is tightly linked to notions of “place” that link individuals and households to the 
people, culture, and physical environment of particular locations.  Hence, better 
geographic variables, including neighborhood-level indicators (e.g. median income, 
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population turnover rates), would greatly strengthen analyses of evacuation behavior by 
accounting for the characteristics of the spatial context in which networks (and other 
variables) are situated.  Again, ethnographic research could examine the cultural 
mechanisms through which notions of “place” and affective bonds between neighbors 
affect evacuation decisions. 
Linking respondents’ to micro-level geographic identifiers would also facilitate 
the inclusion of environmental and storm-related indicators into analyses of evacuation 
behavior.  These data would deepen the understanding of both samples by accounting 
for emergent environmental forces (e.g. flooding), thus strengthening the analysis of 
mobility decisions that took place during and after the storm.  Even more, the inclusion 
of these measures would have represented a significant step toward the theoretical 
objective of developing an integrated understanding of social and environmental 
processes. 
Indeed, the particular limitations of the secondary data used in this thesis 
prevented the adequate integration of social and environmental variables.  A more 
satisfactory analysis would have considered additional aspects of the storm, including 
the relationship between physical vulnerability, perceptions of environmental risk, and 
evacuation behavior.  Moreover, given more detailed geographic data, it would have 
been possible to consider the relationship between race, income (and perhaps other 
factors, e.g. nativity) and environmental vulnerability in the region. 
Despite these limitations and shortcomings, the findings of this thesis confirmed 
that households’ position vis-à-vis mainstream society was important in the context of 
Hurricane Katrina.  This was apparent not only in the significance of race, education, 
and income, but also in the importance of information attainment (number of evacuation 
warnings).  Although the effect of storm preparations raises a number of potentially 
important questions, the former findings support the claim that those with the least 
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resources were least likely to evacuate during Katrina.  This is particularly true for the 
New Orleans sample, where the significance of education demonstrates that evacuation 
is not merely a question of economic capability.  This argument should be used as a 
point of departure for future research, which, with geocoded data and improved 
measures of social networks, should continue to seek an understanding of the nuances in 
environment-related human mobility. 
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